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INTRODUCTION

Instability within a developing region is detri¬
mental both to the region and to interests external to the
region which are dependent on production within the region
or have commitments to nations or factions within the region.
The Middle East is a developing region:

first,

in that

there is an expressed desire to acquire and develop modern
technology and industry;

and second,

makes development possible.

in that oil wealth

The Arab-Israeli conflict is

not the only source of instability within the region.
Economic,

ideological,

national,

and traditional differences

among the Arab nations are sources of potential conflict.
The instability of the Middle East causes resources to be
spent on non-productive military purchases and inhibits
cooperation between nations.

Furthermore, conflict within

the Middle East could engage superpowers in direct confron¬
tation.

Instability in this crucial area must be diminished.
While diplomacy,

negotiation, and coercion can all

be used to reduce tensions between nations,

one viewpoint

states that the cause of conflict is unanswered human need.
This viewpoint sees efforts to better humanity as the best
response to tensions between people.

This study adopts this

humanistic viewpoint and applies it to the needs of the
1
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Middle East.

The method used to address these needs is

prescription.
Prescriptions are made freely by many people.
Prescription in the social sciences must be distinguished
from expressed opinion and unsupported advice.

To make this

distinction a rigorous effort to define a methodology of
prescription has been undertaken.

Though tedious and

perhaps too rigorous to be completely adhered to,

this

methodology serves as the basis for the prescriptions derived
in Chapter Five,

and can hopefully be used for further

prescriptions as the context of the Middle East evolves.
The analysis of the Middle Eastern context made in
this study focuses on the Arab nations,
Arab nations as a region.

and,

indeed,

the

The Arab region is simply defined

as those nations which speak Arabic as a national tongue.
Israel is not ignored in the entire process of regional
development, but is excluded from direct participation in
the early stages of cooperation to minimize the input of
political factors into a process designed to avoid political
confrontation.
The obstacles to cooperation and development within
the Arab region are acknowledged by the process of pre¬
scription as either subjects for action or factors to be
taken into consideration.

Obstacles which were judged to be

currently insurmountable are not ignored but approached
indirectly.
The survey and collation of integration theory was
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undertaken with a single objective in mind:
Theory for Regional Integrative Development.

A Prescriptive
There exists

within the discipline of international integration theory
sufficient analysis,

history,

and criticism of the various

approaches to integration theory.

This study amplifies only

those parts of existing theory which contribute to the
desired collation.
Nothing more than a beginning step has been taken.
Hopefully,

this collation of other people's thoughts will

stimulate further analysis and discussion which may
eventually lead to the refinements necessary to a blueprint
for action.

The Prescriptive Theory for Regional Integra¬

tive Development establishes some guidelines by which such
a blueprint may be drawn.

CHAPTER I

THE METHODOLOGY OF PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY

Values
The purpose of this study is to develop a set of
prescriptions for the Arab Region.
politics strives to be a science,
follow a scientific method.

Since the study of
an effort will be made to

The derivation of prescriptions

must follow the development of a theory if one is to adhere
to scientific methodology.

However, political science

cannot pretend to be a "hard science" held fast by invariable
cause and effect and devoid of any social bias.

Thus,

the

development of a theory which will yield prescriptions for
a particular region involves from its beginning an awareness
and consideration of the context within which it is to be
applied.

The theory becomes a "prescriptive theory" which

transmits certain values which are held true.
acknowledges the presence of "value premises"
sciences.

Gunnar Myrdal
in the social

The following quotation from Myrdal is a caveat

of great importance to the social scientist.
There is no way of studying social reality other
than from the viewpoint of human ideals.
A "disinterested
social science" has never existed, and for logical rea¬
sons, cannot exist.
The value connotation of our main
concepts represents our interest in a matter, gives
direction to our thoughts and significance to our
inferences.
It poses the questions without which there
are no answers.
The recognition that our very concepts are value4
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loaded implies that they cannot be defined except in
terms of political valuations.4 It is, indeed, on
account of scientific stringency that these valuations
be made explicit.
They represent the value premises for
scientific analysis; contrary to widely held opinions,
not only the practical conclusions from a scientific
analysis, but the analysis itself depends necessarily on
value premises.
A value premise should not be chosen arbitrarily—
it must be relevant and significant in relation to the
society in which we live.
It can, therefore, only be
ascertained by an examination of what people actually
desire.
People's desires are to some extent founded on
erroneous beliefs about facts and causal relations.
To
that extent a corrected value premise—corresponding to
what people would desire if their knowledge about the
world around them were more perfect—can be construed
and has relevance.1
Myrdal speaks of a "corrected value premise" which
is what people would actually desire if their "knowledge of
the world around them were more perfect."

Myrdal is imply¬

ing there exists an intrinsic value that becomes more
evident as knowledge of the world becomes more perfect.
Value premises, Myrdal says, must not be surmised arbitrarily
But by what criterion can a value premise be chosen?
intrinsic value defined?
terms of need,

How is

Is intrinsic value defined in

common good, metaphysical principle,

politi¬

cal philosophy, or ideology?
If one is to derive prescriptions for a region, what
values will those prescriptions serve?
peace,

for example,

Obviously J.

Can we assume that

is a common goal for all mankind?

S. Nye thinks peace is not such a goal.

International peace is not an absolute value.
As
Immanuel Kant pointed out two centuries ago, those who
want eternal peace can find it in the graveyard.
Many
Pan-Africanists and Arab nationalists would place peace
second to racial dignity or their view of historic
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justice, and thus argue that the Organization of African
Unity and the Arab League should be used accordingly.2
Peace,
values,

as a value,

such as honor,

is often contingent upon others

dignity,

or justice.

value if certain conditions are met.

Peace is of

In the Vietnam War the

Nixon administration called for peace with honor.

This

meant that peace was of value only if the United States was
able to maintain some degree of credibility with its allies
and some degree of self esteem with itself.

The concept of

peace at any price was unacceptable to American policy makers.
Peace,

in itself, was not an absolute value.
Arab leaders often link peace with justices

Nye's

quote above states many Arab nationalists would place peace
second to historic justice as a value.

Historic justice may

be interpreted to mean the return of all lands occupied by
Israel after the 1967 war and a guarantee of the rights and
a homeland for the Palestinian people.

Nye attributes the

subordination of peace to "historic justice"
nationalists."

to "Arab

If Nye meant by this "nationalists" who

happen to be Arabs,

he would probably be more accurate than

if he meant Pan-Arab nationalists exclusively.

Certainly,

the subordination of peace to justice is true of many
Egyptian,

Jordanian,

Syrian,

and Palestinian nationalists

as well as those Arabs who promote Pan-Arab nationalism.
vital issue is whether Pan-Arab nationalism subordinates
peace more or less than the secular nationalisms of Egypt,
Syria,

Jordan,

and the Palestinian people.

Clearly,

this

A
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issue can only be resolved by an understanding and definition
of the hierarchy of values within each of the respective
nationalisms.

At the heart of the issue of the relative

subordination of peace by Pan-Arab nationalism is the very
nature of Pan-Arab nationalism itself.
Charles Pentland relates peace to integration by
separating the idea of integration from the idea of alliance.
Pentland characterizes peace as a cousin of integration."^
The relationship between peace and integration is much closer
than that of cousin to cousin.

Integration theory must be

established upon an unsubordinated value premise of peace to
be clearly distinguished from the concept of alliance.
From this point forward, Pan-Arabism will be distin¬
guished from Pan-Arab nationalism.

By definition,

Pan-

Arabism will refer to those efforts directed at Arab inte¬
gration which establish peace as an unsubordinated value
premise.

Pan-Arab nationalism will not, by definition,

leave peace unsubordinated.

This definition of Pan-Arabism

does not mean peace is of absolute value.

Peace and inte¬

gration are related to the pursuit of justice through the
means of cooperation and development.

Peace is the keystone

which links integration on one hand with development on the
other.
Having distinguished Pan-Arabism from Pan-Arab
nationalism according to the subordination of peace,
distinction between integration and alliance,

and the

the establish¬

ment of integration as a value premise for Pan-Arabism
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becomes identitive.

If Pan-Arabism does not depend upon

alliance for its unity,

it must depend upon integration.

As Myrdal has said,
chosen arbitrarily.

..."

"A value premise must not be
If a prescription is to be

derived from a "prescriptive theory"

for a particular region,

that prescriptive theory must take into consideration the
desires of those people within that specific region.

If

peace is subordinated to a desire for justice and the
frustration of that desire manifests itself as hostility and
a threat to peace,

then a corrected value premise which

leaves peace unsubordinated must,

nevertheless,

deal with

the frustrations that subordinated peace in the first place.
The value of peace must be supported by other values and
other means that will diminish the frustrations and hostili¬
ties within the region.

Values which are consonant with the

value of peace and yet are capable of addressing the desire
for justice must be instilled in a population that would
otherwise seek war as a means of obtaining justice.
Arabism,

Pan-

identified as the desire for peaceful integration

within the Arab region,

is just such a value.

And yet peaceful integration might take many forms.
J. S. Nye has defined three types of integration:
social,

and political.^

economic,

Each of the types of integration is

broken down into sub-categories.

The sub-categories are

associated with kinds of evidence by which the type of
integration might be measured.

The kinds of evidence pro¬

vide a means of determining the type of integration that
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might be most consonant and supportive of an unsubordinated
value premise of peace.

The sub-category of economic inte¬

gration which Nye calls "Services"

is evidenced by the

expenditure of money on joint services within a region.^
The development of joint services within the Arab region is,
at least on the surface,

a benign activity.

The development

and extension of infrastructure projects could decrease
economic hardship and lessen the plight of the Palestinians.
Though economic development might increase the logistical
capacity of Arabs to make war,
tive.

Thus,

it should decrease the incen¬

the second supportive value premise of a

prescriptive theory for the Arab region is the value of
development.
The value of development is widely debated.

William

Ophuls is perhaps the most eloquent of the many writers who
question the desirability of development.

Ophuls states,

Nothing of real value would be lost if development
were to cease.
Rather, the likelihood of men and women
leading reasonably happy, sane, fulfilled, and harmonious
personal lives would be enhanced.
Moreover, once the
ultimately fruitless and self-destructive quest for
evermore private affluence was abandoned, public amenity
would be free to grow and to produce all kinds of
cultural riches men have been able to enjoy in the past,
even if the gross quantity of production were less than
it is today.'
Ophuls values culture over affluence.

He sees

affluence challenged by the growing scarcity of natural
resources and the environmental impact of exponential growth.
But again,

the question of value cannot be discussed outside

of the particular context of those specific people who might
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hold that value.
fundamentally,

Though Lucian Pye has warned,

"More

it is a tragedy of the transitional society

that the processes of change create profound insecurities in
its people," it is unlikely the Arab region will abandon
development because of the potential for insecurity.^
Hamilton A.

R.

Gibb noted a "wave of antipathy"

world against Western values.^

G. E.

Sir

in the Arab

von Grunebaum observed

"Secular enlightenment does not easily replace sacred reve¬
lation ."Indeed,

a reactionary element has existed and

continues to exist in the Arab region.

The reforms of

Kaddafi in Libya and Wahabi elements in Saudi Arabia,

are

examples of traditionalism, but it is easy to over-romanti¬
cize about the values of tradition.

From the farmer in the

Sudan who longs for a tractor and irrigation to the business¬
man in Beirut who wants replacement parts for his Mercedes
Benz,

the temptations of development and a modernized

society are very tangible.
F. Lamond Tullis questions the power of tradition in
the face of modernization.

He states,

A pervasive value of economic growth exists in
nearly all the countries of the world.
People want to
be not only modern but ultramodern if they can.
Of
course, in terms of the new economic symbols, many
countries have not achieved even a minimal state of
modernity.
Indeed, actually, several have scarcely
incorporated the old symbols of rationality and
secularism.
But no country seems to be immune from the
desire to develop economically.H
Tullis1

argument is not peculiar to himself or

inapplicable to the Arab region.

Indeed,

Daniel Lerner in

his chapter "Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization"
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supports Tullis.
But the societies-in-a-hurry have little patience
with the historical pace of Western development; what
happened in the West over centuries, some Middle
Easterners now seek to accomplish in years.
Moreover
they seek to do it in their own way.12
Lerner not only sees modernization as a widely held
value in the Middle East, he sees modernization as a unify¬
ing principle.
The disorder and poverty in the Middle East . . .
seem incapable of being remedied except by a greater
solidarity among Islamic countries and by a general
modernization in the countries.
But though modernization
is a tangible fact, only the pace of which might require
control and acceleration, Muslim solidarity is only a
fleeting, variable, uncertain supposition. . . .
Modernization, then, is the unifying principle in this
study of the varied Middle East.13
Modernization and development are aspirations found
in the Middle East.

To build prescriptions on a value system

which incorporates peace,

and development as cornerstones

does not stray from the sentiments of the Arab people.
Development is consonant with the desire for peace and with
the process of economic integration.
thesis will be the linkage of peace,

The major task of this
integration,

and

development into a prescriptive theory for the Arab region.
The Economic Commission for Western Asia has written that,
"The ultimate satisfaction of needs, material or otherwise
depends,

.

in the final analysis on progress achieved in

producing goods and services."^

If development is seen as

a means for the "ultimate satisfaction of needs, material or
otherwise

..."

then the linkage of development defined as

such with peace and integration will not ignore the cultural

.
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and identitive values of the Arab people nor will it ignore
the abiding desire for the provision of justice to the
Palestinian people.

Peace through integration and develop¬

ment will provide a means for attaining justice.

Upon this

hope the following theory will be developed.
Having acknowledged the value premises for a
prescriptive theory for Regional Integrative Development,
the derivation, validation,

and methodology of prescriptive

theory can follow.

Prescriptive Theory
The definition of a prescriptive theory requires an
understanding of the role of the social scientist in the
process of theory building.
defined until theory,

itself,

A prescriptive theory cannot be
is defined.

Gustav Bergman,

the Swedish philosopher, has stated,
A theory is a group of laws, usually rather few, from
which others, usually a larger number, have actually
been deduced and from which one expects to deduce still
further ones.
The laws that serve as the premises of the
deductions are called the axioms of the theory, those
that appear as conclusions are called its theorems.15
The definition of a prescriptive theory is made up
of two parts.
theory;

The first part is the general definition of

the second part is the modification of the general

definition of theory brought about by the acceptance of the
limitations of the social scientist in creating a theory
that fits the abstract definition of theory.

The modifica¬

tion of the general definition of theory is more of an
addition than an amendment.

Prescriptive theory differs from
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simple prescription because of a definitional integration
that allows the basic definition of theory to remain intact.
The juxtaposition of prescription and theory requires a
precise schematic of the foundation which is the definition
of theory.

The process of deduction,

or the analytical

reasoning from the general to the particular,

is the

operation that takes place within the structure of a theory.
Hempel's visualization of the structure of a theory is
illustrative.
A scientific theory might therefore be likened to a
complex spatial network:
Its terms are represented by
the knots while threads connecting the latter correspond,
in part, to the definitions and, in part to the funda¬
mental and derivative hypotheses contained in the theory.
The whole system floats, as it were, above the plane of
observation and is anchored by its rules of interpreta¬
tion. 16
But what is the purpose of a theory?
purpose of the process of deduction?

What is the

May Brobeck offers,

A theory is such a deductively connected set of laws.
It has the logical form of an explanation.
Some explan¬
ations (those that explain statements of individual
facts) contain both laws and statements of individual
facts as premises.
In a theory all the statements, both
explained and explaining, are generalizations.!^
Brobeck's description proposes that a theory's pur¬
pose is explanation.

Certainly in the physical sciences

explanation is a primary purpose of theory.
Galileo,

Newton,

physical reality.

The theories of

and Einstein all explain the behavior of
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff observe.

Application of this scientific method during the last
250 years has produced some very impressive results in
the "hard sciences"--particularly in the form of univer¬
sal uniformities or generalized laws.
In physics,
astrophysics, chemistry, biology and certain areas of
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psychology a high degree of predictability has been
achieved.
But even the "exact" sciences with all their
powerful methodologies, reach limits to what can be
known at any given minute.
According to Werner
Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, for example,
it is not possible to determine simultaneously both the
position and the movement of a particle of matter.18
Explanation and prediction are two purposes included
in a general definition of theory.

However,

even in the

"hard sciences" predictability is undermined by Heisenberg's
principle of indeterminacy which states that the process of
observation itself becomes a factor in the outcome of any
determination.

Heisenberg's principle applies to inanimate

sub-atomic particles.

The observations of social scientists

also contain this potential for affecting outcomes.
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff further noted.
As we pointed out earlier, scientists are dubious of
a capability to explain unaccompanied by a corresponding
capability to predict.
Most social scientists readily
concur with the historian's judgment that unique human
events and choices lie beyond predictability.
We cannot
assign a precise probability to a "discrete event."19
To explain or predict a scientist must first observe.
Given that these observations may interfere with the outcome
of a study. Max Weber adds another restriction to the pro¬
cess of observation.
Now, as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way
in which life confronts us in immediate concrete situa¬
tions, it presents us with a multiplicity of successively
and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both
"within" and "outside" ourselves.
The absolute infini¬
tude of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished
even when our attention is focused on a single "object,"
for instance, a concrete act of exchange as soon as we
seriously attempt an exhaustive description of all the
individual components of this "individual phenomena,"
to say nothing of explaining it causally.
All the
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analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind
can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a
finite portion of this reality constitutes the "object"
of scientific investigation, and that it is only
"important" in the sense of "worthy of being known."20
Theory has a structure that can be defined in terms
of its deductive processes;

however,

the structural defini¬

tion of theory is insufficient to bridge the gap between
the logical and abstract aspect of pure theory and the prag¬
matic and prescriptive aspect of social theory.
Morgenthau,

Hans

in his magnum opus Politics Among Nations, writes

about the necessity of the adhesion of theoretical con¬
sistency to empirical reality.
The test by which such a theory must be judged is
not a priori and abstract but empirical and pragmatic.
The theory, in other words, must be judged not by some
preconceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to
reality, but by its purpose:
to bring order and meaning
to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain
disconnected and unintelligible.
It must meet a dual
test, an empirical and a logical one:
Do the facts, as
they actually are, lend themselves to the interpretation
the theory has put upon them and do the conclusions at
which the theory arrives follow with logical necessity
from its premises?
In short, is the theory consistent
with the facts and within itself?21
A general definition of theory requires the power of
explanation and prediction.

These powers ultimately depend

upon the capability of a scientist to observe events in such
a way that these observations may be interpreted by the
theory.

It has been postulated that:

One, prediction,

and

therefore explanation are not readily available to the social
scientist,

and;

two,

the process of selecting "the object of

scientific investigation"

involves a value judgment as to

what is "worthy of being known."

As stated earlier,

the
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observations of social scientists contain a potential for
affecting the outcome of the situation they are studying.
Rather than being disheartened by the embarrassing role of
clumsy interloper,

the social scientist can acknowledge his

presence and the responsibility that presence entails.
Having entered into the equation of human behavior,

the

scientist can realize the prescriptive capacity of theoriz¬
ing.

To ascribe prescription to theory is nothing more than

to recognize a potential inherent in the observation
necessary to the formulation of theory.

Theory and Policy
Myrdal has noted that,

"It might be useful to recall

at the start that the social sciences have all received their
impetus much more from the urge to improve society than from
simple curiosity about its workings."22
In describing the properties of methods for policy
analysis,

James S.

Coleman has stated that,

"It is important

at the very outset to sharply distinguish a methodology that
has as its philosophical base the testing of theories from a
methodology that has as its philosophic base a guide to
action."23
It is because a methodology of testing theories
cannot be isolated from a methodology of policy prescription
that Coleman's distinction must be contradicted.

What is

needed is a bridge between social theory with its component
value premises and social policy which requires a basis from
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which it can be derived.

The idea that policy can be dis¬

tinguished from theory is only the admission that much policy
is based on undeveloped or unidentified theoretical proposi¬
tions .
In his description,

Kenneth Hoover proposes that,

The most conventional posture for a social scientist
is one of pragmatism:
a theory is only as good as its
present and potential uses in the service of human needs.
It is tempting, but misleading, to conceive of theory
as something rocklike and immobile behind the whizz and
blur of daily experience.
Rather, theory is a sometimes
ingenious creation of human beings in their quest for
need fulfillment.
People create theories in proportion
to their needs and the theories they create can be either
functional or disfunctional to those needs.24
Hoover contends that theories occur in proportion to
the needs of humanity,

and that the usefulness of theory can

be determined in relation to those human needs.

There can

be no clear dichotomy between a theory or a policy, both
which are responsive to human needs.

The absence of this

dichotomy probably inspired Coleman's search for a clear
distinction.
that,

Charles Pentland identifies a group of scholars

in accordance with Coleman's wishes,

into a particular category,

separates theory

that of "scientific theory;" and

in the same paragraph notes that "students of integration
theory" seem to avoid the question of the validity of such a
distinction.
The theory to which these communities of scholars
aspire is usually seen as some kind of logically inter¬
related set of general statements capable of empirical
testing.
It provides description explanations and often
predictions about the empirical world, with reference to
which it is commonly being reformulated.
Whether such
"scientific" theory can or ought to be the sole aspira¬
tion and preoccupation of political scientists has been
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and remains, a contentious issue.
Most students of inte¬
gration quite willingly leave the debate over a "general
theory" of politics to others, and simply assume that it
is both necessary and possible to develop islands of
"middle range" theory in such areas as theirs.25
By accepting the notion of a "middle range"

theory

those students postulate the existence of a bridge between
theory and policy.

Pentland goes on to say,

Few integration theorists, however, would accept that
explanation is the sole or sufficient purpose of theory.
Indeed, normative positions are rarely, if at all, dis¬
guised in their writings.
Integration itself is assumed
to be a good thing--a proposition which is understandable
if not exactly self evident.
From such general proposi¬
tions and assumptions, numerous prescription flow,
although theorists differ considerably as to the emphasis
they place on policy advice.
In functionalist writings
the advocacy of solutions for specific social and politi¬
cal problems is usually the main object of argument, but
it does not follow that necessarily an explanatory theory
cannot be found as well.
Conversely, the most self¬
consciously "scientific approaches," such as those of
Haas and Deutsch, do not preclude (and often in fact
encourage) the derivation of policy advice by those
engaged in the politics of integration.
In short, the
normative foundations and prescriptive uses of theory
are a part of the total fabric of an approach, and to
examine them closely may aid in an understanding of its
explanatory components.26
Before attempting a rigorous definition of
prescriptive theory,

some discussion of the typology of

theories beyond the simple dichotomy of "scientific" or
"pure"

theory and prescriptive theory is in order.

One

typology suggested by Conway and Feigert classifies theories
as to the perspective from which they are applied and the
terrain which they cover.
Three different interpretations can be made of what
it is a theory represents, these three being labelled as
descriptive, instrumental, and realist.
According to
the realist view, a theory is either true or false.
Thus,
one evaluates a theory in terms of success of efforts to
falsify it, or more accurately to falsify deductions from
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the theory. . . . The second view of theory is that a
theory is not and cannot be considered in terms of its
accuracy in describing reality.
The instrumentalist
interpretation views a theory as a means of organizing
one's perceptions of reality.
As such it provides rules
for organizing one's perception of reality.
Thus, it
can be evaluated in terms of its usefulness in doing
that.
The third interpretation views theory as
descriptive, that is theories are not true or false, but
describe in a simplified fashion, aspects of reality.
A concomitant aspect of this descriptive view is that
theories do not explain.27
^
The three views of theory put forth above address
themselves to different intellectual needs and are evaluated
by different means;

however,

all three are abstracted from

direct involvement in the terrain to which they are applied.
The social sciences study human behavior;
behavior is described without explanation,
theory is little more than narrative.

and,

if human

then descriptive

The organization of

perceptions of reality which takes place in the instrumen¬
talist view of theory can be evaluated,

but only to the degree

that organization effects human response to human behavior,
not to the degree that theory promotes an organization of
perception in itself regardless of the consequences of such
organization.

If theory is evaluated by its ability to

organize perception,

the question of whether or not the

organization promotes well being is ignored.
view,

realist theory,

purports to be scientific,

on the method of falsification.
tion,

The remaining
depending

By the method of falsifica¬

if a theory or its deductions are falsified,

or

contrary to observation then the theory is invalidated.
is it not conceivable that a theory could be manifestly

But

20
contrary to fact or present conditions and still have social
utility?

If a theory sets forth a group of interrelated

propositions that have no present empirical truth or validity,
but in their construction contain a self-fulfilling potential
for the modification of present reality in accordance with
those propositions,

does not that theory contain the poten¬

tial for social utility,

regardless of its present state?

Within their typology of theory,

Dougherty and

Pfaltzgraff include,
A type of theory . . . defined as a set of proposals
of action for the statesmen.
Such prescriptions are
usually:
(a) assumptions about the international system
such as the existence of a balance of power (variously
defined) in which political actors supposedly take one
or another course of action to achieve a particular kind
of goal; or (b) policy recommendations based upon the
results of the study of one of several instances of a
particular kind of political behavior.28
Prescriptive theory is that type of theory that
synthesizes the abstract principles of deduction and inter¬
nal consistency with the normative assumptions and the policy
recommendations arrived at through the empirical process of
scientific investigation.'
tion overarching.
theory is a hybrid,

Prescriptive theory is by defini¬

While it can be argued that prescriptive
it is a hybrid necessary to those social

scientists who realize that if theory is to engage reality
then it must pass every test of internal consistency before
being applied to the laboratory of human hopes and human
misery.

To those who hold themselves accountable for what

they do or fail to do and the consequence therein,
prescriptive theory provides a guide to action that passes
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both empirical and logical testing prior to policy implemen¬
tation.
The methodology of prescriptive theorizing would
involve the following steps:
1. The identification of value premises held by the
society under study
2. The correction of those value premises to coin¬
cide with empirical reality
3. The statement of propositions from which deduct¬
ions can be drawn
4. The derivation of those deductions and their
transformation into policy plans, prescriptions,

programs

and projects
The above methodology is at best skeletal,

but can

serve as the framework for the development of specific
prescriptive theories.

In the formation of a prescriptive

theory of Regional Integrative Development for the Arab
region,

the third step,

"the statement of propositions from

which deductions can be drawn," will involve a .comprehensive
synthesis of many theories and sets of theories.

Prior to

this synthetic process an introduction to the context and
the outline of the synthesis is necessary.
final introductory section,

Following the

the synthesis of a prescriptive

theory of Regional Integrative Development

(RID)

will begin.

Setting
In the second half of the twentieth century mankind
has lived with the horrible possibility of nuclear holocaust.
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This horrible potential of war,
imperative for peace.

ironically,

has become an

Not only must direct nuclear power

confrontation be avoided, but situations capable of trapping
nuclear powers into inescapable confrontation must be modi¬
fied.

The Arab-Israeli conflict,

belligerency,

a constant state of

spanning thirty years punctuated by four wars

is just such a situation capable of spawning the unthinkable.
A state of non-belligerency in the Middle East would not only
benefit Arabs and Israelis, but would also defuse the explo¬
sive potential of US-Soviet confrontation.

War in the Middle

East has as recently as 19 73 brought US nuclear forces to a
global alert.
However illogical nuclear confrontation may be,

in

the heat of conflict where client states are battling for
survival and regional hegemony and global prestige are at
stake,

illogical decisions can be made.

The global alert of

1973 in itself is sufficient warning to the world to warrant
an international interest in a lasting peace.

Numerous

prescriptions, projections and proposals for peace in the
Middle East have been ventured.

Negotiation, mediation,

and

enforced settlement are all methods by which peace might be
obtained.

Much has been written about shuttle diplomacy,

comprehensive peace plans,

and Geneva conferences.

The

eminent statesman, George W. Ball, has written.
Thus the time is ripe for the United States to take
a strong hand to save Israel from herself and in the
process try to prevent a tragic war that could endanger
the economies of the major non-Communist powers, separate
the United States from its allies and precipitate an
enormous internal debate, and pose a serious danger of a
clash with the Soviet Union.30
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Ball's suggestion for an imposed settlement is one
of many approaches that might be taken to reduce military
and political antagonism; however, his description of the
consequences of "a tragic war"

is widely accepted.

Whatever

approach is taken to instigate peace in the Middle East, one
caveat must be heeded:
peace fails,

If a concerted effort to bring about

the likelihood of war will probably increase.

The great effort of Anwar Sadat, however inspirational,
tains an element of risk.
tions,

If peace initiatives,

con¬

negotia¬

or imposed settlements are not founded on the willing¬

ness of all parties in the region to accept the resultant
equilibrium,

the challenges persuant to that equilibrium will

be destabilizing.

Though it is possible that a diplomatic

settlement is attainable and would have lasting value,

to

limit the peace effort in the Middle East to such a settle¬
ment plays a dangerous game of probabilities.
diplomatic solution,

a social,

economic,

Beyond a

and technical pro¬

gram to promote regional development and cooperation would
increase the incentives and probability for a lasting peace
in the Middle East.
A regional program of development and cooperation
must balance many variables.

It is useful to categorize

these variables into three groups:
and empirical.

theoretical;

political;

Theoretical variables are the components of

the prescriptive theory from which the regional program is
drawn.

Political variables may be seen as the motivations

of and the restraints upon political actors in the region.
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Empirical variables are not in themselves political and tend
to be quantifiable, but nevertheless determine political
realities.
Obviously,

theory,

politics and empirical data are

epistemologically interrelated and have definite overlap.
However,

the differentiation of the three categories of •

variables allows for the isolation of political factors from
the effects of theoretical prescriptions on empirical reality.
The reason for this differentiation is to downplay intracta¬
ble political differences and actively modify empirical
reality through theoretical prescription.

It is not so much

that these theoretical prescriptions should ignore political
variables as they should avoid injecting political or
factional considerations into a program that should be
regional in scope and homogeneous in character.
The relationship between theoretical and empirical
variables constitutes a continuous loop with an interchangeability of cause and effect.

The political variables con¬

stitute an area contained by the theoretical and empirical
loop.

The three sets of variables constitute a system but

the set of political variables does not directly interact
with the loop.

Political variables define an area around

which the interactive loop must be drawn.

The prescriptive

theory requires the definition of all three sets of variables.
The identification of those theoretical,

empirical,

and political variables necessary to the formation of a
theoretical prescription must take into consideration the
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ultimate objectives of such a prescription:
development.

peace and

The objective of peace has been modified to

mean that peace which derives from regional cooperation
rather than peace which is imposed upon an unwilling populace,
either by external pressure,

internal repression,

or the

utter exhaustion that would follow a future Middle Eastern
war.

The objective of development must be defined in the

context of the optimal use of all resources.

Further defini¬

tion of peace and development must limit these objectives to
a scope appropriate to the corresponding levels of coopera¬
tion achieved vis-a-vis the Arabs and the Israelis.
A regional cooperative program may be defined as
Arab-Israeli cooperation or inter-Arab cooperation.
Israeli cooperation could be implicit or explicit.

ArabExplicit

Arab-Israeli cooperation is not acceptable to all Arabs, but
implicit cooperation is desirable if tensions in the region
are to be reduced.

Implicit Arab-Israeli cooperation could

take the form of simultaneous or reciprocal, yet ostensibly
unilateral efforts at disarmament and promotion of attitudes
of friendship between hostile peoples, on one hand,

and an

increase in diplomatic and technical cooperation in inter¬
national organizations on the other.

A multi-phased program

of diminishing hostilities could be the prelude to an
explicit program of Arab-Israeli cooperation.
While the prospect of increased inter-Arab cooperation
might intimidate Israel with the possibility of a unified
Arab military force,

a program of cooperation that emphasized
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the creation of a stabilizing network of investment,

trade,

and development projects would increase the incentives for
peace for all Arab nations.
Eventual Arab-Israeli cooperation could be a conse¬
quence of Arab investment in development projects within the
Arab region.

Such investments could create an infra¬

structure that would be perceived to be of sufficient value
to discourage war.

The conservation of peace in the Middle

East thus becomes a function of the development of incentives
for peace through two tiers of cooperation:
first tier,

and Arab-Israeli,

inter-Arab,

the

the second.

The development of peace incentives may be tacitly
approached as a by-product of regional economic integration;
thereby diminishing resistance to peace by placing the widely
accepted value premise of regional development as the impli¬
cit vanguard of the peace initiative.

In this way,

that

segment of the Arab world that could not work for peace
directly,

could have that powerful emotion,

national pride,

sublimated into a pan-Arabist goal of regional development.
Clearly,

it is well worth the time to try to define a system

of development and integration that would promote an end to
hostilities in the Middle East.

This thesis is an attempt

to define just such a system which will be called a system
for Regional Integrative Development.

Regional Integrativo DevGlopment:
A Prelude
The definitions of regional integration and
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development are a necessary prelude to a specific analysis
of the Middle Eastern context capable of determining the
strategy,

scope and specifics of Regional Integrative

Development.

The wealth of articles,

anthologies,

and

treatises devoted to the concentric circles of theory,
hypothesis,

and empirical generalizations that surround the

adolescent discipline of regional integration

provide the

resources necessary to the task of a relevant definition of
Regional Integrative Development.

The completion of the

definition of Regional Integrative Development must utilize
research and theory in the field of regional development.
The ready synthesis of the related fields of regional inte¬
gration and regional development will then serve as the
prescriptive network that can be superimposed on the empiri¬
cal field of the Arab region.

From this superimposition of

derivative and synthetic theory upon empirical data,

specific

prescriptions can be elicited.
Regional integration theory may be,
from world order theory,

functionalism,

itself,

derived

and what may be

debatedly called the Idealist perspective of International
Relations theory.

The synthesis of Regional Integration

theory and Regional Development theory gives a form to
Regional Integrative Development theory which may be
visualized as two vertically congruent structures which
converge at a juncture of increasing specificity.
of its antecedent specificity.

By virtue

Regional Integrative

Development theory is capable of empirical validation and
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endowed with prescriptive potential.
The convergence of Regional Integration and Regional
Development theory is an admittedly prescribed juxtaposition,
which in itself is laden with both empirical analysis and
value premises identified in the previous discussion of value.
Nevertheless,

Regional Integrative Development theory is

perfectly capable of being judged according to Professor
Morgenthau's previously quoted criteria:

internal consist¬

ency and external validation.
In that Regional Integrative Development theory

(RID)

is derived from the antecedent theories of integration and
development,

a certain level of empirical validation is

already inherited.

The more germane methodology of empirical

validation of prescriptive theory first evaluates the outcome
of prescriptive policies derived from the theory and secondly
analyzes the entire setting in search of interceding varia¬
bles that might have affected that outcome.
The internal consistency of RID theory is dependent
on the collation of the diverse components which constitute
each of its antecedent theories.

The diversity of Integration

Theory and Development theory may be seen as having vertical
and horizontal dimensions.
Horizontal diversity derives from the many scholars
who have contributed their own interpretations of integration
and development.

The collation of horizontal diversity

involves the definition of the range of the diverse theoreti¬
cal interpretations of integration and development and the

29
redefinition of operational terms within these disparate
interpretations and location of areas of consonance at
similar points within the horizontal dimension and to choose
among the dissonances those particular interpretations most
consonant with the whole.
Vertical diversity derives from the different levels
of theoretical specificity,

differentiated by the degree of

the narrowing focus of attention.

The collation of the

vertical dimension involves the imposition of a consistency
dependent upon an adherence to definitional precedence
established at the highest level of abstraction inherent in
the general theory.

By establishing definitional precedence

at the highest level of the vertical dimension,

the process

of complete theoretical collation then can spread downward
incrementally exhausting the horizontal diversity of each
vertical level before moving to a lower level of abstraction.
To achieve the exhaustion of diversity,

the process of

collation must limit itself to a less than comprehensive
domain of theory,

but will,

nevertheless,

attempt to address

the major areas of Integration and Development Theory.
In concrete terms,

a theory of Regional Integrative

Development must derive its internal consistency from the
logical arrangement of its component parts.

Within each of

the component theories collated in the horizontal dimension
there exists a backlog of empirical or external validation.
However,

since the process of collation involves selective

perception,

the subsumed empirical validation of the components
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is insufficient for the new, hybrid theory.

This thesis

will look to the Arab region itself for historical,
gical,

sociolo¬

and political validation for the Prescriptive Theory

for Regional Integrative Development.
The construction of a prescriptive framework for a
working peace in the Middle East begins with a foundation of
theory.

The particular type of theory most suited for pro¬

viding a prescriptive framework has been defined.

The

creation of A Prescriptive Theory for Regional Integrative
Development for the Arab region will involve the collation
of existing integration and development theories, but to
avoid a hodge-podge,

an effort will be made to define the

terminology used in the theory building process,
the input to the "classic"

and to limit

integration theorists and those

commentators who best interpret "classical"
language relevant to the study at hand.

theory to

CHAPTER II

THE DERIVATION OF DEFINITIONS

Integration theory covers a wide range of disciplines.
Economics,

sociology,

and political science all contribute to

the multi-disciplinary study of integration.
focus is narrowed to a single discipline,
science,

Even when the

such as political

integration theory cannot easily be pinned down.

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff comment,

"...

political integra¬

tion cuts across the traditional fields into which political
science is organized,

and is as relevant to the student of

politics at the local and metropolitan level as to the student
of comparative and international politics.""'"

Many approaches

to the definition of integration must be accommodated in a
composite theory.

A collation of definitions is more of an

umbrella under which different theories are placed than a
true amalgamation in which various definitional components
are rearranged into a new definition.

From this umbrella of

definitions several approaches to integration theory can be
discussed with the eventual aim of weaving together some of
the common threads in each of the approaches.

It would be

difficult to meld theories together with a definitional pre¬
cedence that,

due to its amalgamation,

precluded,

the substance of theories from which it was drawn.

in part,
An early

narrowing of a definition would impede the process of
31
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building a composite theory of integration.

A wide defini¬

tion of integration should accommodate many integration
theorists,

and their many approaches to integration.

A narrowing focus on integration theory relevant to
prescriptions appropriate to the Arab region will precede
from divergent approaches to integration.

The ultimate goal

of this manipulation of theories is the Prescriptive Theory
for Regional Integrative Development.
toward this goal,

As the focus narrows

the process of collation will be dictated

by the necessities of relevancy rather than the whimsies of
semantic exercise.
region,

The end result must be applicable to a

and must emphasize mutual development.

caveats,

These

admittedly arbitrary, will be the tools for the

construction of a prescriptive theory.

Many controversies

concerning regionalism, development, and the nature of inte¬
gration itself will not be resolved.
however,

Out of necessity,

the Prescriptive Theory for Regional Integrative

Development will adopt positions which are controversial and
which have been widely debated in integration literature.
Again,

the side of the argument will be determined by the

context to which the prescription is to be applied.

In each

case where a decision is made between conflicting definitions
and approaches,

an effort will be made to analyze the conse¬

quences of the alternative definitions and approaches.

Definitions
The definition of integration can vary from Galtung's
rather simple "the process whereby two or more actors form a
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new actor"

2

to Karl Deutsch's somewhat refined.

To integrate generally means to make a whole out of
parts--this is, to turn previously separate units into
components of a coherent system.
The essential
characteristic of any system . . . is a significant
degree of interdependence between its components, and
interdependence between any two components or units
consists in the probability that a change in one of them-or an operation performed on one of them--will produce a
predictable change in the other. . . .
. . . Integration, then, is a relationship among
units in which they are mutually interdependent and
jointly produce system properties which they would
separately lack.
Sometimes, however, the word "integra¬
tion" is also used to describe the integrative process by
which such a relationship or state of affairs among
separate units is attained.3
Deutsch's refined definition raises a primary issue
in the determination of what integration is.
a process or a condition?
and joined by many.

Is integration

This debate has been commented upon

Ernst Haas notes that,

"The root of the

trouble is that scholars disagree about whether the term
'integration1

refers to a process,

a condition or both.

To

make matters worse, many writers vary the sense according to
the context.Haas's reference is to an earlier definition
of integration put forward by Deutsch which describes inte¬
gration as a condition in which people "have attained within
a territory a sense of community and of institutions and
practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure,
a long time,

for

dependable expectations of peaceful change among

its population."5

Haas argues that Deutsch's earlier

definition begs the question.

He notes.

The leading exponent of the transactional approach to
integration is Karl Deutsch.
The flow of transactions
in terms of volume--i.e., a process--constitutes one
dimension of his analysis.
But at the same time Deutsch
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defines integration as a condition under which "integra¬
ted" states have forgone the use of violence as a means
of settling their differences.
Thus some of the indica¬
tors by which the final condition can be identified also
serve as a definition of the process; ranges of trans¬
actions constitute integration.
This manner of concep¬
tualizing the phenomenon makes it exceedingly difficult
to isolate cause and effect.6
Perhaps Deutsch's refined definition written in 1968
was adjusted to Haas1

observation.

Considerable interplay

and cross reference exists in the realm of integration theory.
Amitai Etzioni's note on page six of his book Political
Unification demonstrates this interplay that existed in the
formative period of integration theory.

The note is offered

here to introduce a discussion of Etzioni's concept of inte¬
gration as well as for it's clarity and definition of the
positions of perhaps the three most important contributors to
the field of political integration.
We shall refer below to the state of the system, with
respect to the properties discussed, as its "level of
integration."
It should be noted, though, that we are
dealing with political integration, not with religious,
economic, or general integration.
Karl W. Deutsch, et
al. use "integration" to refer to the relationship among
countries that no longer anticipate engaging in war with
one another (Political Community and the North Atlantic
Area.
Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press,
1957, p. 31).
Canada and the United States, for instance,
are "integrated."
This is a different definition, one
that has a lower threshold than ours.
Ernst B. Haas
uses "political integration" to refer to "the process
whereby political actors in several distinct national
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expecta¬
tions, and political activities toward a new center,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over
the preexisting national states."
(The Uniting of
Europe.
Stanford, California:
Stanford University
Press, 1958, p. 16.)
The threshold of this definition
is higher than that of Deutsch, et al. but not as high
as ours.
(Cf. Haas' discussion of "political community"
pp. 4-11.)
In particular, it does not require the
ability of the "institutions" to significantly affect

the allocation of resources as does our definition.
Note also that "Haas" uses "integration" to refer to a
process while we use it to refer to a condition (Deutsch
uses the concept to refer to both).7
Etzioni mentions in his note above that his defini¬
tion of integration has a higher threshold than either
Deutsch's or Haas'

definition.

By using the term threshold

Etzioni is clearly referring to integration as a condition
that comes into being when a certain threshold is passed.
Etzioni's concept of integration is related to the existence
of political communities as opposed to political systems
which are "interdependent" rather than "integrated."^

A

"political community" or a community which is politically
integrated has
. . . three kinds of integration:
(a) it has an
effective control over the use of the means of violence;
(b) it has a center of decision-making that is able to
affect significantly the allocation of resources and
rewards throughout the community; (c) it is the dominant
focus of political identification for the large majority
of politically aware citizens.9
Etzioni sums up with,
a state,

"A political community is thus

an administrative-economic unit,

and a focal point

of identification."-^
Clearly Etzioni's threshold is high and his concept
of integration is more rigorous than that of Deutsch or Haas
Haas'

definition roughly corresponds to Etzioni's second

kind of integration.

Haas'

process whereby political actors

in different settings "shift their loyalties to a new center
would at its culmination result in a condition much like
Etzioni's condition B,

"a center of decision-making that is
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able to affect

.

.

.

the allocation of resources and rewards

throughout the community."
By concentrating on the earlier definitions of inte¬
gration given by Deutsch, Haas,

and Etzioni,

a glimpse of

the complexity involved in the formulation of a composite or
umbrella definition of integration has been given.

Were it

not for the works of authors such as Joseph Nye or Charles
Pentland which have already undertaken a survey of integra¬
tion theory and an analysis and comparison of existing
definitions any work seeking to apply a most definition of
integration to a particular context would be almost immeasur¬
ably more difficult.

Indeed,

Deutsch, Haas,

and Etzioni,

in

their early writings were talking about a type of political
integration.

Though a scholarly comparison and evaluation of

the many approaches to the definition of integration is worth¬
while,

to a certain extent it already has been attempted.

Furthermore,

regional integrative development obviously

addresses itself to economic as well as political variables.
Though one may be tempted,

it would not be appropriate to

raise the controversy surrounding the distinction and over¬
lap between politics and economics.

It will suffice to say

that economic integration is a type of integration that has
relevance to integrative development.
B" of integration

Etzioni's "category

(center of decision-making that is able to

affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards
.

.

.

)

can easily be seen as a general description of the

result of a process of economic integration.
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Before moving to the subject of economic integration,
a comment on the nature of integration is appropriate.
discussed above,
tion.

As

integration is seen as a process or a condi¬

Though one might argue the ontology of integration as

a thing in itself,

our concern is less with integration in

itself and more with a definition that is suitable for a
particular theory.
prescriptive theory,

In that the theory in discussion is a
the process of integration must precede

the hoped for condition.
definition,

This does not preclude Etzioni's

it simply emphasizes those policies,

programs,

and actions necessary to the attainment of the hoped for
condition.

The aim of the prescriptions to be derived is

not integration for itself,

rather the fruits brought forth

by an active process of integrative development.

For that

reason integration will henceforth be seen as a process.
Furthermore,

the distinction is slight, because process and

condition are only ways of conceptualizing.

No condition is

absolutely static and no process is completely fluid.

What

is important to the definition of integration must be
extracted from those theorists who perceive integration as
a condition as well as those who perceive integration as a
process.

The discussion of integration will not stray from

the over-arching necessity to create a working system for
the provision of integration and development in the Arab
region.
Joseph Nye has written.
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. . . a more fruitful approach is to break apart the
concept of integration, develop concrete measurements for
its component parts, and leave the relationship between
them open for empirical verification.
The concept of
integration (defined as forming parts into a whole) can
be broken down into economic integration (formation of
a transnational economy), social integration (formation
of a transnational society), and political integration
(formation of a transnational political system).H
It is obvious that economic integration has relevance
to the prospects of regional integrative development.
integration,

in the typology of Nye,

Though

has three major compo¬

nents and definitions appropriate to each component,

regional

integrative development will be defined as a subset of
economic integration which subsumes social and political
integration as background conditions.

Thus,

the definition

of integration will be approached from the economic per¬
spective,

and supported by the concepts inherent in political

and social integration.
Integration may be defined in general terms, an
expression of the concept of unification;
components,

or if broken into

integration may be defined with specific reference

to particular events,

practices, and relationships.

Economic

integration relates to a set of established approaches or
definitions which rely upon many quantifiable or emergent
characteristics.

Trade volume can be measured.

The

existence of a regional organization is readily observable.
A tangible set of characteristics can be ascribed to a defi¬
nition of economic integration.
economic integration is abundant.

Literature pertinent to
The narrowing focus of

definition moves through the broad field of integration into
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the mid-level of economic integration.

The collation of

concepts at the broadest level of integration theory serves
as the foundation for the definition of economic integration.
Galtung's aforementioned definition of integration,
"the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor"
is sufficient for the foundation of the concept of integration
Deutsch's "refined" definition expands the concept of
integration to the level of systems theory, but really adds
little to the foundation of the concept.

Actually Deutsch's

earlier definition which required "dependable expectations
of peaceful change" builds upon Galtung's foundation by
introducing the value of peaceful relations between units as
a particular characteristic of integration.
condition,

Etzioni's first

"effective control over the use of violence" is

perhaps too strong for a definition of integration that is
to be used as the basis for regional integrative development
in the Arab region.
notion of a

Vie have already noted that Etzioni's

"center of decision-making that is able to affect

significantly the allocation of resources and rewards" could
be the result of economic integration,

but again,

our

definition of economic integration cannot depend upon a
hoped for result for its substance;

the definition must

accommodate the process by which a result is to be achieved.
The result of regional integrative development cannot
presuppose the prescription.

The definition of economic

integration is needed to narrow integration further so that
it can serve as a bridge to the narrowest and most precise
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definition of the type of integration necessary for regional
integrative development.

By defining the type of integra¬

tion necessary to regional integrative development,

the

prescriptions for that type of integration become evident.
The definition of integration capable of providing incentives
for peace and development in the Arab region must take into
account all of the variables and circumstances inherent in
the Middle Eastern situation.

The purpose for the tedious

deductive derivation of definition from the general to the
specific is to guarantee the widest input into the process
of prescription.

A definition of integration derived

inductively from the variables and circumstances inherent in
the Middle Eastern situation might not contain sufficient
external input to serve as a prescription.

Prescriptions,

more often than not, must be derived from external inputs.
Induction would only extrapolate from the facts as they are
and not from conditions as they should be.
Fortunately, much work has been done in the area of
economic integration from which a definition can be deduced.
Bela Belassa's definition of economic integration is perhaps
best known and will be dealt with directly later.
expedite the process of collation,
collation will be cited.

Now,

to

an already derived

Again it is Joseph Nye who most

concisely states the point.

Nye advances the progress of

definitional derivation by adding the concept of regionalism
to economic integration.

Though this may seem a little like

placing the cart before the horse,

it must be reemphasized
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that the task at hand is the arrival of the reader at
prescriptions,

not a comprehensive treatise on every politi¬

cal variable that might be encountered.
regionalism will be forthcoming,

A definition of

but at this point we must

assume that region used in the context of regional economic
integration will not present insurmountable problems to the
reader.

At the risk of sounding parenthetical,

regionalism

will have a greater bearing on the later discussion of the
effect of superpower incursion on the prospects of regional
integrative development in the Arab region.
Nye writes.
Regional economic integration is not a simple con¬
cept.
The formation of a regional transnational economy
involves considerations of welfare and considerations of
interdependence, and the two are not exactly the same.
For example, a degree of protection may create a trans¬
national economy among a group of countries in the sense
of increasing their interdependence in trade or flow of
factors of production.
Indeed, production may be
necessary to prevent the countries in the region from
being integrated into the global economy or into other
partial transnational economies.
But if the effects of
trade diversion exceed those of trade creation (assuming
no important dynamic effects), there may be a net loss
in regional welfare.
From the viewpoint of a liberal
economist concerned only with the welfare effects of the
optimal allocation of regional resources that a perfect
market mechanism would produce, it would seem undesirable
to call the results of such protection "integration."12
Nye has suggested the complexity of regional economic
integration.

In the preceding quotation Nye introduced the

concept of trade diversion.

Trade diversion will demonstrate

a point about complexity in developmental integration.
Suliman Demir defines trade diversion in the context of its
opposite:

trade creation.
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Trade creation is defined as a shift from high-cost
to low-cost sources of supply within the integration
area; trade diversion is a shift from a low-cost source
of supply outside the integration area to a high-cost
producer within it.13
The classical definition of economic integration is
provided by Bela Balassa in his book Economic Integration.
Balassa's five categories,

or stages of integration are the

starting points for most debate on the subject of economic
integration;
gories,

however, before directly discussing those cate¬

let us first examine further the concept of trade

diversion as it applies to developing regions.

Trade diver¬

sion would in a "classical" situation be a severe obstacle to
integration.

Of course other obstacles exist,

but trade

diversion will serve as a good example of the modification
necessary to adopt classical theory to the developing
context.

Trade Diversion
Trade diversion occurs because of several reasons.
The transfer of technology from industrial to lesser developed
countries

(LDC's)

is often the transfer of relatively obso¬

lete design and equipment.

Industrial nations have a vested

interest in their technology and the transnational corpora¬
tions

(TNC's)

operate on the profit motive.

The TNC1s will

not sell controlling interest in their most advanced tech¬
nology to LDC's if it is more profitable to retain the best
means of production.

Also,

if an economically integrating

region has an insufficient market to reduce the price of a
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locally produced item by providing an economy of scale,

then

those items will be more expensive than items produced in
countries with economies of scale and access to world mar¬
kets.

The result of a relatively obsolete industrial plant

and the absence of an economy of scale is trade diversion.
If trade diversion in a region outweighs trade
creation then the impetus toward regional economic integra¬
tion is stymied, but not necessarily stopped.

The decision-

makers in a developing region must determine if the relative
disincentive of trade diversion is outweighed by the benefits
of developing industries within the region.

Global equations

of comparative advantage do not necessarily balance when
calculated by regional elites.

Arguments can be and have

been made for the protection of infant industries,
industries in developing nations or regions,

or

that without

protection would otherwise be unable to operate.
An example of trade diversion would occur if by
agreement nations in an underdeveloped region decided to pro¬
duce refrigerators,

and deny refrigerators produced outside

the region access to the regional market through the use of
a prohibitive common external tariff.

If in this case the

regionally produced refrigerators cost more than the exter¬
nally produced refrigerators,
of trade diversion.
diversion be,

then this would be an example

But what would the effects of trade

and how does trade diversion bear upon the

question of regional integrative development?
The regionally produced refrigerators would cost
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regional consumers more than the externally produced refrig¬
erators,

tying up more capital in the absolute consumption

of refrigerators.

However,

regional manufacturers, workers,

and middlemen would earn money that would otherwise leave
the region.

The complexity of analysis is overwhelming,

and

seemingly unanswerable questions are raised.
Integration may simply be seen as making one out of
many.

Economic integration is the merging of many economies

into one.

There are many impediments to successful integra¬

tion in the Arab region.
such an obstacle.

Trade diversion analysis is just

Can national consumers be convinced or

coerced into foregoing the purchase of less expensive and
often more attractive goods in favor of more expensive
regionally produced items?

To what degree should coercion

be applied to the promotion of regionally produced goods?

At

what point does the cost/benefit ratio of regional industry
protection reach the level relative negativity?

No specific

answers can be provided for such general questions, but that
the questions must be asked clearly demonstrates the
problems that can occur when an aspect of a classical inte¬
gration theory is applied to a developing region.
General definitions become less valuable as RID
theory seeks to specifically address itself to and gain its
validation from a particular region.

A move toward the

specific shears away the intellectual excess baggage of
generalization and brings into focus the Arab region.

What

is required is an ever-increasing level of specificity which
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is consistent with antecedent theory and the ever-increasing
detail that is encountered as the process of theory building
leaves the comfortable generalities of integration theory
and enters into the sticky realities of integration efforts
in the Arab region.

The prospect of trade diversion is an

impediment to regional economic integration.
ment,

As an impedi¬

trade diversion shears off those parts of a definition

of regional economic integration which fail to consider trade
diversion.

Furthermore, by no means is trade diversion the

only impediment to regional economic integration in the Arab
region.

Political and economic impediments abound.

cal conflict,

different levels of development,

Ideologi¬

unequal dis¬

tribution of natural resources, historic national conflicts,
insufficient economic infrastructure,
of labor,

unequal distribution

and export oriented economies are but a few of the

more obvious impediments to economic integration in the Arab
region.

Each impediment spawns a prescription.
With a hint of the impediments to regional economic

integration extant,

the definition which is to be modified

into a definition of Regional Integrative Development can be
placed upon the carving board.
As previously mentioned,

the economist Bela Balassa

has created five categories for economic integration.
Balassa's categories correspond to progressives stages of
integration and are distinguished by specific characteristics.
The table below illustrates Balassa's categories.
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BALASSA'S CATEGORIES OF
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

No
Tariff
or
Quotas

Free
Common
Flow
External
of
Tari ffs
Factors

Harmoni zation
of
Economic
Policies

Uni fication of
Policies,
Political
Ins titutions

1. Free Trade
Area

x

2. Customs
Union X

X

3. Common
Market X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

4. Economic
Union X
5. Total
Economic
Integration
Source:

X

X

Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration.

Though the table is somewhat self explanatory,

it

should be reemphasized that the five categories are presented
as a natural progression,
following stage.

each stage a prerequisite for the

Nye has problems with this.

At first glance the Balassa categories appear to be
particularly suitable for use by political scientists.
The first two categories correspond to the legal cate¬
gories of Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, while the last refers explicitly to political
institutional criteria and thus relates economic inte¬
gration to political integration.
On the other hand.

47
there are a number of problems involved in using only
this approach.
For one thing, the popular usage of many
of the terms can be misleading.
The "common market"
label is more widely applied than practiced—witness the
so-called Arab Common Market.
A cynic might say that 4^
regional economic schemes are more common than market.14
Nye raises three other objections to Balassa's
definitional categories:
planned economies;

the categories do not consider

the categories have only trade related

definitions and fail to consider shared services;
categories are formal, not behavioral.
work for trade exists,

trade,

and the

(Though the frame¬

itself, may not.)

further distinguishes "Economic Integration"

Nye

into EI^ or

trade interdependence and EIS or shared services.!^
Obviously trade diversion is an obstacle to Elt but
does not interfere with EIS.

The development of regional

services allows limited resources to be applied efficiently.
Services also tend to be apolitical,

and thus encounter less

resistance.
Soliman Demir has commented on the relevance of
comprehensive integration schemes in the Arab region,

and in

doing so reverts back to Balassa's categories as his point
of embarkation.

To begin with,

Demir also uses Balassa as

the source for a definition of economic integration.

Demir's

reference to Balassa clearly defines each of the categories.
Economic integration is conventionally defined as a
process and a state of affairs.
As a process, it encom¬
passes various measures abolishing discrimination between
economic units belonging to different national states;
viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by
the absence of various forms of discrimination between
national economies.
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As a process economic integration would have pro¬
gressing stages that culminate in total economic inte¬
gration.
Balassa, one of the often quoted specialists
on the subject, distinguishes among the following forms
of economic integration:
(a) a free trade area, where tariffs and quantitative
restrictors between the participating countries
are abolished, but each country retains its own
tariffs against non-members;
(b) a customs union, which unifies the tariffs of
integration partners against non-members;
(c) a common market, which allows for the free move¬
ment of factors of production (not only commodi¬
ties as in (a) and (b), among the integration
partners;
(d) an economic union, which entails a degree of
harmonization of economy, monetary, fiscal,
social, and countercyclical policies among mem¬
ber countries;
(e) total economic integration, which presupposes
the unification of economic, fiscal, and other
policies, and requires the setting up of a supra¬
national authority whose decisions are binding
for member states.
(Source:
Balassa, The Theory
of Economic Integration.)16
The Arab nations have experience with a comprehensive
effort at integration in the Arab Common Market.

The use¬

fulness of comprehensive integration schemes for developing
nations has been widely challenged.

Demir's comment is,

The movement toward integration in developing
countries through generalized trade liberalization
(i.e., comprehensive integration schemes), has not pro¬
duced any particularly bright or successful examples.
There are political as well as economic difficulties
surrounding the implementation of comprehensive integra¬
tion schemes based on trade liberal!zation.17
John Renninger,

an expert on West African integra¬

tion efforts for the United Nations Institute for Training
and Research

(UNITAR)

has observed.

The free trade areas, common markets, economic
unions and other types of regional economic integration
schemes raised hope that they would result in rapid
economic growth in the countries involved.
With few
exceptions, the schemes failed to live up to these
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early expectations.
Difficulties of various kinds were
encountered, and by the early 1970,s the enthusiasm for
such schemes had diminished.-1-8
The Arab experience with a common market is best
expressed by Dr.

John Munro.

Certainly there is everything to be said for the
idea of an Arab Common Market, an idea which received
its first important regional sanction at the Arab League
Economic Council Meeting in 1961, when it was proposed
to translate national planning into regional planning.
Under the Economic Unity Agreement, the Arab Economic
Unity Council was given the task of preparing a blue¬
print, which would enable the Arabs to coordinate their
economic development, prepare programs for the realisa¬
tion of joint Arab development projects, and draw up
proposals which would lead to the coordination of the
agricultural, industrial and trade policies of the
member countries.
Unfortunately the Council's work was
soon bogged down by political hassles, and fifteen years
later, though some progress had been made, the Arab
Common Market is more of a Platonic ideal in the
economists' minds than a tangible reality.19
There is little doubt that the Arab region wants to
promote integration,
is:

the efforts are manifest,

the question

What are the proper means to successfully integrate the

Arab efforts for development?
Suliman Demir offers an answer.
The project approach to economic integration has
been perceived as an appropriate vehicle for institu¬
tional cooperation and possibly higher integration at a
later stage.
One of the apparent advantages for project
cooperation is that countries partner to the scheme of
cooperation retain their control over economic affairs
almost intact.
Secondly, the gains and losses to the
various partners are more readily identified and agree¬
ment on compensatory schemes can be easily reached.
Moreover project cooperation entails on embarking on new
activities of production and investment in cooperating
countries, rather than redistribution and reallocation
of existing utilized capacities.
This last reason should
be appealing to most developing countries, particularly
in the case of the Arab region.20
A program of integration based on projects rather
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than trade will enhance the motivation of national actors.
If the development of regional services and industry is
pursued,

then the very tangible benefits of electrification,

improved transportation,

education,

and health program

coupled with a substantial supportive infrastructure will
promote the acceptance of integration.
Regional Integrative Development will thus be defined
by the application of general economic integration theory
to the special requirements of a developing region.

Regional

Integrative Development is a program of development that
seeks to offset the short term problems inherent in regional
economic integration among developing nations by promoting
regional industrial,

infrastructure,

and service projects.

Regional Integrative Development
defined through a process of derivation;

(RID)

has been

however,

RID theory

must be developed in the context of its antecedent theories.
Definition is a priori and somewhat arbitrary;
building,

theory

though contingent upon definition, must draw upon

the backlog of integration theory for its substance.
ignore the labors of Mitrany,
Balassa,

To

Deutsch, Haas, Etzioni,

and the host of scholars devoted to the discipline

of integration would be academic blindness.

The evolution

of a discipline may bring a student to a highly differenti¬
ated subdiscipline

(in the sense that RID theory is a subset

of integration theory)

but only after homage is paid to the

founders of the original discipline.
academic ritual,

Far from being

the identification and exegesis of the
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founding theories of integration establishes the language
and concepts of a Prescriptive Theory of Regional Integrative Development.
established,

However,

once a theoretical framework is

the identification of prescriptions will derive

from the regional context using theory as a vehicle.

CHAPTER III

COLLATION OF INTEGRATION THEORIES

A study of integration theory should begin with
David Mitrany.

Mitrany,

the British political scientist,

is often described as a dreamer and a poet?

in any case,

Mitrany is the acknowledged father of functional integration.
Influenced by the early Fabians, Leonard Woolf, G.

D.

H.

Cole and Norman Angell, Mitrany gave substance to functionalism in his book, A Working Peace System.

In his book Mitrany

states,
The task that is facing us is how to build up the
reality of a common interest in peace. . . . Not to
build a peace that would keep nations quietly apart, but
a peace that would bring them actively together; not the
old static and strategic view of peace but a social view
of it. ... We must put our faith not in a protected
but a working peace; it would indeed be nothing more or
less than the idea of social security taken in its
widest range.1
Ernst Haas in his opus Beyond the Nation-State
defines the ambition of the functionalists,
Functionalists, in the specific sense of the term,
are interested in identifying those aspects of human
needs and desires that exist and clamor for attention
outside the realm of the political.
They believe in the
possibility of specifying technical and "non-controver¬
sial" aspects of governmental conduct, and of weaving an
ever-spreading web of international relationships on the
basis of meeting such needs.
They would concentrate on
commonly experienced needs initially, expecting the
circle of non-controversial to expand at the expense of
the political, as practical cooperation became coterminus
with the totality of interstate relations.
At that
point a true world community will have arisen.2
52

53
Mitrany makes a clear distinction between the politi¬
cal and the technological.

To Mitrany peace can be achieved

if man organizes around the common,
health,

transportation,

shared needs for public

agricultural development,

downplays the vargaries balance of power,
tarism,

etc.,

and

diplomacy, mili¬

and what may be described as mankind's darker desire

for dominance.

Mitrany's optimism is based on the assumption

that man's darker nature is a product of "social and economic
maladjustments."

Chadwick Alger extracts what he perceives

to be the basic assumptions of functionalism found in Mitrany1
writings.
1. Social and economic maladjustments are the basic
causes of war.
2. Social and economic welfare is the precondition
of peace.
3. The nation-state system cannot deal with basic
social and economic problems because global society is
arbitrarily divided into units based on territory rather
than units based on problems to be solved.
4. Institutions based on function, not territory,
would be appropriate for solving basic social and econo¬
mic problems.
5. Functional cooperation can begin with nonpolitical, more technical problems.
6. Co-operative experience gained in one functional
area can be transferred to another.
7. Co-operation will extend to more and more
functions to the point that a "web of international
activities and agencies" will "overlay political
divisions."
8. Ultimately these agencies will require coordi¬
nating bodies, which will eventually require planning
agencies, which will eventually evolve into a general
authority for over-all co-ordination.3
Functionalism would have nationalism replaced by
organizations which respond to the needs of humanity.

The

organizations would address specific needs and would allow
for a withering away of the state.

Quoting Haas again,
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Instead of attacking nationalism and sovereignty
frontally, the Functionalist aims at solving these
problems by simply ignoring them and relying on the
systemic forces and a learning process for eventually
transcending, rather than defeating, the old order.^
After the transcendence of the nation-state,
government would be possible.

a world

We must now question the

relevance of functional integration, with its global per¬
spective,

to the Arab region.

In answer to this question it

must be first noted that Functionalism is a starting point
for the general theory of integration.

Federalism,

Pluralism,

and Neo-functionalism will be discussed in turn, with each
approach adding substance and direction to the final synthe¬
sis.

It must also be noted that Functionalism, with a global

perspective of non-controversial integration can with a few
expressed reservations be applied to a regional context.
Chadwick Alger explains,
Mitrany drew insight from the experience of public inter¬
national bodies dealing with health, transport and
communication, which emerged in the nineteenth century,
as well as from functional activity within nation-states
where he observed that fascination with constitutions
and central authority often obscured more basic processes
of national integration.
By doing so he provided con¬
ceptual linkage that made it possible to apply a wide
range of social science knowledge to problems in inter¬
national organization--with respect to attitudes,
loyalties, socialization, learning, communication, over¬
lapping membership groups, etc.
But it remained for the
scholars working under the rubric of regional integration
explicitly to identify and explore these linkages.^
Functionalism is criticized in many corners because
it seemingly ignores the concept of power.

Haas states,

We can easily summarize the criticism leveled at
Functionalism by writers in the Realist tradition:
they
merely assert the primacy of the political and take for
granted the presumed hard outer shell of the sovereign
nation-state.6
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This direct criticism of Functionalism is appropriate
to its application to the Arab region.

In a personal inter¬

view of the Arab League's ambassador to the United Nations,
the ambassador.

Dr. Helmi,

criticized the weakness of mind

that causes man to generalize and many to lump all of the
Arab nations together.^

National interests and divisions

exacerbated by the presence of intrusive powers are powerful
adversaries to regional cooperation.®
however, blind to nationalism.

Functionalism is not,

Functionalism recognizes

nationalism as an obstacle that is better ignored than
antagonized.
head on,

Unlike Federalism which attacks nationalism

Functionalism,

in a nearly Taoist way,

promotes

activities which wear away the power of the nation-state
through the provision of services to citizens of the state.
Power is not denied,

it is simply avoided.

It is this avoid¬

ance of power that spawns a more germane critique of
Functionalism.
Ernst Haas,
Inis Claude,

drawing on the works of J.

remarks that the Functionalists'

P. Sewell and
separation of

power and welfare is untenable.
Power and welfare are far from separable.
Indeed,
commitment to welfare activities arises only within the
confines of purely political decisions, which are made
largely on the basis of power considerations.9
Mitrany was not unaware of his critics and in 1972
wrote in an article entitled "A Political Theory for a New
Society,"
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In the international sphere its (Functionalism)
scope must be ... to concentrate sectors of activity
under some collective authority, and so build up
gradually, the substance of an international society and
of international government; until at a deeper level the
two sides merge to the same purpose.
Political world
government is not possible but common government is both
possible and necessary in those things which need to be
governed in common.10
Rather than attempt a definition of power,

in the

case of Functionalism it will suffice to say that power is
not exclusively drawn from nationalism,

and if gradualism is

adopted there is at least a reasonable chance that the power
of reason,
prevail.

upon which Functionalism depends, will eventually
In the Arab region there may be sufficient finan¬

cial power in the form of petrodollars associated with
rational approaches to development and cooperation,
Functionalism practical.

to make

Admittedly nothing is guaranteed

but it is difficult to argue against a theory which promotes
welfare and cooperation.

It becomes even more difficult to

argue against such a theory if its sponsors within a region
have vast financial resources.
A second criticism of Functionalism concerns its
lack of a clearly defined end.
occurs globally then what,
end product?

whole.

indeed, will be the nature of the

Functionalism provides a means to an end but

leaves the end,
Functionalism,

If functional integration

itself,

to be defined.

It can be argued to

if practiced might not lead to an integrated

What assurance is there that Functionalism will not

spawn new regional,

rather than global centers?

What would

the effect of regional organization be on world peace?

Again
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the scholastic debate on this question alone is worthy of
more space than this study is prepared to give.
As stated earlier,

in the Arab context,

regional

functional integration could provide positive incentives for
peace.

In the long run,

the survival of Israel and the

creation of a lasting peace cannot depend on the disharmony
and the relative underdevelopment of the Arab people.

It is

one of man's nobler ideas that development and cooperation
are contagious.
Robert McDonald writes about two divergent approaches
to regionalism,
Two divergent approaches to regionalism could be
discerned:
(1) regionalism as an approach to inter¬
national security, by means of an implicit or explicit
Great Power hegemony, and (2) regional functional inte¬
gration by means of intra-regional cooperation in the
field of economics, cultural activities, and social
affairs on a level assumed to transcend politics.H
Inherent in the second approach to regionalism defined
by McDonald is the supposition that intra-regional cooperation
would promote global security.

If developing regions can

cooperate with themselves and with the industrial regions
then peace will be promoted.

The complexity of global

dynamics precludes any South-South and North-South pre¬
dictions;
attempted.

nevertheless,

some generalizations have been

Rosenbaum and Tyler write,

A central dimension of South-South relation ... is
that they are normally shaped by North-South relations.
The international economic system's four functional areas-monetary, trade, investment, and aid--provide a constella¬
tion of issues capable of stimulating consensual and conflictual relations among the LDC's, but these relations
generally are also conditioned by North-South relations.12
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Rosenbaum and Tyler go on to say,
A major cause of South-South relations has been the
discovery by LDC1s that they confront common problems
with their relations with the North.
International
and regional organizations have played a major role in
aggregating LDC interests.13
Regional functional integration can be seen as a
process of aggregation which creates larger units imbued with
forward linkage to an ultimate global system.

A purely

Functionalist view would argue the point.
According to many functionalists . . . the integration
theorists have taken a fundamentally wrong turn--toward
a narrow pre-occupation with the building of massively
bureaucrat!zed regional super-states--which has led them
away from the central issue of world order.14
If,

in fact,

the Arab region were to become a

"massively bureaucratized regional super-state",

then world

order might be threatened by any of the hypothetical con¬
flicts below:
1. Arab-Israeli leading to superpower conflict
2. Arab-African on the horn of Africa
3. Arab-Persian over the oil fields
4. Arab-Soviet on ideological grounds
5. Arab-OECD on the price of oil
It is quite possible to fantasize any number of
holocausts, but in reality,

the probability of any conflict

can be diminished by the existence of rational decision
making organizations whose interests in stability would temper
any potential conflict.

Furthermore,

if regional function-

alism anticipates possible conflict through the initiation
of multi-regional,

and peripheral cooperation then world
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order is greatly enhanced.

Regional functional integration

thus becomes a strong leg upon which Regional Integrative
Development stands.
A brief discussion of Federalism is required because
of the attempts at federation which have taken place with
the Arab region.

In 19 50 the members of the Arab league

signed a pact which was to have led to military and economic
unification.The United Arab Republic was formed in 1958.
On April 17,

1971 the Quadripartite Summit in Cairo led to

an agreement to form the Federation of Arab Republics.
The one thing all of these efforts have in common is that
they failed.

The reasons for failure are manifold.

Etzioni's chapter,
Republic

"A Union That Failed:

Amitai

The United Arab

(1958-1961)" in his book Political Unification

accounts both historically and theoretically for the failure
of the UAR.

Etzioni's concluding sentences in the chapter

are provocative.
. . . the ease with which the UAR tumbled reflected
a thinness of the political basis for this particular
union.
But what actually tumbled was the institutional
structure, while the building stones of the union--to
the degree they were ever available--remained basically
intact.17
The Federation of Arab Republics was apparently
built with the same stones but in the case of the FAR,

the

mortar was even weaker.
Federalism results in the creation of a supra¬
national state.
of Federalism,

Charles Pentland describes the simplicity
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The classic federalist picture of international inte¬
gration has the same deceptive clarity and simplicity
as Hobbes1 description of the birth of Leviathan.
The
essence of the integrative process, according to this
view, is the formation, among a group of previous
sovereign powers, of a common supranational state.18
Federalism conflicts with sovereignty thus is best
pursued in political conflict,
turmoil.

revolution or post-colonial

Federalism is, by its nature,

dramatic.

It would

be easy to say the last hope of an Arab federation died with
Nasser.

The liberation of the Arab states from their

colonial masters recedes into history,
liberators pass from the scene.
rapidly.

and the charismatic

But conditions can change

The ripeness of history is difficult to judge.

Was Muhammad anticipated?

An Arab federation is not impossi¬

ble,

Furthermore,

it is only unlikely.

it is conceivable

that an effort to force an Arab federation could have dis¬
astrous effects.

Federalism is best approached indirectly.

,Neo-functionalism is just such an indirect approach.
Lindberg and Scheingold distinguish neofunctionalism from
functionalism according to neofunctionalism1s approach to
the nation-state.
Neofunctionalism differs from traditional functionalism in that it establishes some prerequisites to
effective problem solving which involve a partial but
direct threat to the autonomy of the nation-state.19
The linkage between Federalism and neofunctionalism
is in their common goal to "transcend the nation-state."
They differ in their strategies to achieve the goal:
Federalists using political means;
economic means.^

neofunctionalists using

Neofunctionalism does not,

however,

avoid

61
political interaction as does Functionalism.
The essence of the neofunctionalist argument is that
political integration comes about less through pressures
from functional needs or technological change as such,
and more through the interaction of political forces-interest groups, parties, governments, international
agencies—which seek to exploit those pressures in pur¬
suit of their own interests.21
Certainly in the Arab region, or any region for that
matter,

political forces are at work.

But perhaps more so

in the Arab region than any other region,

there exists a

great potential for the application of those political forces
to problems of regional development.

A neofunctionalist

approach with its manifest encroachment on sovereignty could
divert attention from development to a perceived attack on
the nation-state,

or worse yet,

create the impression among

the oil-poor states that the oil-rich states were attempting
to buy their sovereignty.

The wisdom of Functionalism is

that it avoids confrontation with those whose power is
derived from the nation-state.
naive,

Far from being politically

the Functionalist in the Arab region may show the

greatest political sagacity.
The fourth major approach to integration is
pluralism.

Karl Deutsch defines the product of integration

as a security-community.
A SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people which has
become "integrated."
By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a
territory, of a "sense of community and of institutions
and practices" strong enough and widespread enough to
assure for a "long time" dependable expectations of
"peaceful change" among its population.
By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part
of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement
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on at least this one point:
that common social problems
must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful
change."
By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social
problems, normally by institutionalized procedures,
without resort to large-scale physical force.22
Deutsch goes on to define and differentiate amalga¬
mated and pluralistic security communities.
By AMALGAMATION we mean the formal merger of two or
more previously independent units into a single larger
unit, with some type of common government after amalga¬
mation . . .
The PLURALISTIC security-community, on the other
hand, retains the legal independence of separate
governments.2 3
The relevance of Deutsch's pluralism to Regional
Integrative Development among the Arab nations lies in the
sequential definition of a pluralistic security community.
Pentland notes,
For those who, like Deutsch, are mindful of the
tenacity of the nation-state and concerned primarily
with preserving peace in the international system, the
less ambitious but more stable pluralistic form of
community must seem both a pragmatic and realistic
aspiration.24
If development is to be pursued then sense of
community with an expectation of peaceful change must exist
as a precondition to investment in the region.

A pluralistic

security-community is the only viable alternative for the
same reasons that an Arab Federation is unlikely:

the

sovereignty of the nation-state.
This chapter has only touched upon the four classic
approaches to integration theory:
neofunctionalism;
However,

and,

functionalism;

federalism;

pluralism.

each of the four approaches has deposited
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concepts into the Prescriptive Theory for Integrative
Development.

Without question,

for integrative development.

functionalism is the basis

In both functionalism and

Regional Integrative Development,
point of coalescence;

common welfare is the

but RID differs from pure functionalism

in that it seeks to address regional welfare.
development or project oriented,
functional organizations.

Though RID is

it requires the creation of

RID employs political power to

achieve welfare objectives but does not challenge sovereignty.
RID presupposes the conditions inherent in a pluralistic
security-community but through its program of development
enhances regional cohesion.

RID defines its objectives in

social and economic terms and leaves the political outcome
to its natural conclusion.
The juxtaposition of classical integration theory
with development theory is simplified by the collation which
has already taken place.
article,

Charles Issawi has written in his

"Growth and Structural Change in the Middle East,"

that four obstacles exist to development in the Middle East.
These are:
1. Arab-Israeli War
2. defense spending conditioned by tensions
3. the reduction of efficiency caused by extension
in the public sector
4. population growth^S
Jahagir Amuzegar identifies three approaches to
economic development:
Public-Private mixes.^

Arab socialism, Arab capitalism,
Mr.

and

Issawi's choice of obstacles

seems to indicate that he would choose the Arab capitalist
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approach to development.

Economic development theory can be

approached from either an ideological or technical stand¬
point.
issue,

Mr. Amuzegar looks at development as an ideological
and Mr.

development.

Issawi takes an ideological approach to
Mr. Amuzegar has identified three potentially-

conflicting approaches to development.
adopted one of those approaches.

Mr.

Issawi has

Regional Integrative

Development cannot afford to divide the Arab world into
three conflicting camps.
concrete,

RID must approach development in

technical terms.

As stated previously,

mate satisfaction of needs, material or otherwise,
people of a country depends,

"The ulti¬
of the

in the final analysis on pro-

gress achieved xn producing goods and services.'

p7

The United Nations publication goes on to state,
"Developments in production,

therefore, become the focal

point in any attempt to review economic and social progress,
9P
or in short, growth."^0
One aspect of a technical definition of development
is the identification of economic goals and social goals.
Whether these goals are approached capitalistically or
socialistically does not impact the goal outside of the
relative efficiency and equity of the different approaches.
Another aspect of a technical definition of develop¬
ment is the specification of specific projects through
objective means which seek to reconcile profit motives with
social utility.
Economic and social goals must be defined,

and
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development projects must be identified.

The definition of

economic and social goals must take place within the
restraints of the attainable, but should be high enough to
meet the demands of a burgeoning population.

The United

Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia has applied the
standards set forth in the International Development
Strategy to a national and regional review of the Middle
East.

National objectives are defined in development plans

of the nations within the region.The existence of
nationally defined objectives meets one of the requirements
for a technical approach to development.
The identification and prioritization of development
projects is more difficult as it requires a degree of con¬
sensus and compromise.

The best approach to the identifica¬

tion of projects is the use of project packages with
detailed implementation plans and realistic schedules of
completion.

By the presentation of packages to investors

and labor suppliers,

trade-offs could be accomplished.

Regional development should promote consensus and
compromise;

it should not be tied to a particular ideologi¬

cal system or predominant national interest.

Mr. Amuzegar's

Public-Private mix on a regional scale may be the best
approach to development.

In the same way that East-West

trade is often mutually profitable, Arab socialism and Arab
capitalism can seek an accommodation.
Hopefully,

the theoretical focus has been narrowed

to the point of clarity.

The process of collation was

dictated by the necessities of the region.
been modified by the region;

The theory has

now through the derivation of

prescriptions the theory will directly engage the region.
The interaction of the theoretical and the empirical is
unavoidable.
complete.

The horizontal collation of diverse theory i

The vertical collation has reached its final

stage of specificity requiring only the consistency of the
prescriptions for completion of the internal validation of
the theory.

CHAPTER IV

APPLICATION OF THEORY

Having established a theoretical foundation for
Regional Integrative Development,

it is now possible to

apply the theory to the Arab region itself.

Though we have

previously discussed the "Setting" in Chapter I,

this

earlier discussion was developed only to the point of the
identification of value premises.

The application of

Regional Integrative Development Theory to the Arab region
requires the exploration of all factors contributing to or
detracting from the prospects of integration.

In particular,

special attention must be given to the existing framework of
regional interdependence and those specific areas where
development projects are feasible must be identified.
Furthermore,

a good deal of research and speculation concern¬

ing regional economic integration and project development
has already begun,

and must be acknowledged.

Regional Integrative Development has been likened to
regional functional integration.

RID has been further

limited to programs or projects designed to develop regional
cooperation.

A discussion of the Arab region will enhance

an understanding of background conditions relevant to RID.
Regional Integrative Development in the Arab Region
must be molded to the needs, expectations,
67

and aspirations
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of an awakening population.

RID must consider regional

P^^tics and inter-state relations;

the unique economic and

demographic distributions within the Arab region;
and hegemonical influences.

and global

The prescriptions which evolve

from this study are developed from theory and given substance
by the Middle Eastern realities.

Economic Factors
Although political cooperation among the Arab
countries is still of paramount importance in view of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, economic cooperation is
perceived to be of vital and urgent nature.
The Arab
oil exporting countries are accumulating large financial
reserves that their economies cannot absorb, while nonoil Arab countries experience shortages in financial
capital and hard currencies.!
At this point in history,

a tremendous opportunity

exists within the Arab region:

the opportunity for regional

development.

the inequality of distribu¬

At the same time,

tion of oil revenue presents an equally tremendous opportunity
for regional destabilization and conflict.

The petrodollars

earned by oil exports are accruing at a rate greater than
the ability of some states in the region to absorb them.

An

influx of dollars can lead to financial chaos within a
country if that influx is not carefully managed.

At present

many Arab Gulf states are investing heavily in Western
capital markets.

On the other hand, Egypt,

Sudan are suffering from capital shortages.

Syria,

and the

Internal and

regional economic destabilization can occur because of the
appearance of petrodollars.
There seems to be little agreement on what exactly
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are the oil reserves present in the Arab region;
case,

but,

in any

oil reserves are limited and the benefits of petro¬

dollars must be maximized.

For the potential investor of

petrodollars, many opportunities are available and if the
investor is to realize maximum benefit from his petrodollars,
many factors must be taken into consideration.
First,

one cannot expect an investor,

his identification with the Arab people,

however great

to invest in pro¬

jects that cannot return a fair amount of profit.
must be clearly distinguished from charity.

Investment

Charitable

contributions are of little more than short term relief for
economic deprivation.

Though valuable in emergencies,

charitable contributions can do little to provide for future
contingencies.

By purchasing consumable goods and commodities

with petrodollars, Arab investors would only delay the time
when the same needs would plague the region.

Investment in

capital goods provides the means for future production.
Investment in agricultural projects provides the production
of food for a growing population.
tion,

electrification,

Investment in transporta¬

regional services and education pro¬

vide the infrastructure for future development.
the aforementioned investments in industry,
transportation,

electrification,

But even

agriculture,

services and education must

have the potential to produce a profit.

The investor must-

compare the profitability of short term investments in
Western capital markets with the profitability of long term
investments in the Arab region.

The argument for short term
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investment in Western money markets is that petrodollars
gain high interest and are relatively secure.

Investment in

short term money markets also allows for almost immediate
access on the part of the investor to his investment.

Also

investment in Western capital markets allows for a certain
amount of political leverage vis-a-vis the Western
industrial states whose economic stability greatly depends
upon recycled petrodollars.
Profitability of investment must be determined in
light of other circumstances that modify the wisdom of
certain approaches to investment.

Investment potential must

be analyzed in the widest possible time frame.

Clearly much

debate has already taken place on the advisability of
diverse schemes of development,

and heated argument has

transpired over the topics of export strategy versus
industrialization,

regional markets versus the global market,

free trade versus infant industry protection, but the
choices of the guardians of the Arab petrodollars are some¬
what simpler and less antagonistic.
Investment in western capital markets protects the
petrodollars against inflation and at the same time protects
the viability of the western international economy;
money cannot endlessly buy more money.

however,

There must be a time

of convertibility when money buys goods and services.

The

real question for the Arab investor is what is the proper
mix of investment and what is the proper timetable for
convertibility.

The western industrialized states are
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easily seen as the goose whose ability to lay eggs depends
greatly on its feeding schedule of petrodollars.
health of the goose is a real concern,

Though the

this study is

primarily interested in what to do with the eggs.

At

present there is every indication that Saudi Arabian policy,
for one,

takes into account the health of western economies.

The real question is what will the long term effects of
present investment policy be on the stability and viability
of the Arab region.

Albert Gray states the dilemma clearly.

Wealthy Arabs from the conservative Persian Gulf
areas are the most likely to invest in Egypt at this
time.
They will do so only if Sadat can convince them
that there are profits to be made in Egypt, and that
their investments are secure from nationalization.
Nasir's socialist policies and his actual sequestration
of Arab assets in the 1960's dried up this source.
It
will take some time for these funds to start flowing
again.
The problem with these private Arab investments when
they do come in is that they are apt to be concentrated
in the building of high rise luxury apartments and fancy
hotels along the Nile.
They yield fast profits.3
Gray's point is that there is great temptation to
use petrodollars for investments in the already developed
"luxury sector" of the economy.

If in fact petrodollars are

invested in this manner they are at least providing an input
into labor markets,

and employment and capital to a popula¬

tion in need of both.

However,

it is difficult to dispute

Gray's inference that the funds could be better spent else¬
where .
John White of the Institute of Development Studies,
University of Sussex,
states,

is perhaps more precise when he
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It is reasonable to suppose that the first concern
of the surplus States is to find investment opportuni¬
ties which will yield an acceptable return on their
resources, i.e., to use the opportunities created by
oil revenues in a manner which takes into account the
exhaustibility of the resources from which these
revenues are derived and which provides the surplus
States with alternative sources of income to replace
their wasted assets.
It is conceivable that they may
occasionally enter into large isolated commitments on
concessionary terms as in some cases they have already
done, in the manner of any conventional bilateral donor,
but it is not conceivable that they should enter into a
general responsibility for underwriting with concession¬
ary finance the development programmes of all their
neighbors.4
There must be a perceived incentive for oil rich
states to forego the short term benefits of high profit
investments in favor of investments which provide the
opportunity for long term stability.

As is the case with

the choice between investments in western capital markets or
in the Arab region,

petrodollar investors must balance

immediate profit with the long term need for stability within
the region.

If it were possible to build a model for the

regional and global economy for the next one hundred years,
Arab investors could guarantee a maximum return on their
investment while at the same time maximizing regional develop¬
ment;

but no such model is possible.

before,

First,

as stated

the extent of oil reserves is unknown.

Second,

the

impact of development on regional stability is problematic.
It is simplistic to assume that Saudi dollars can buy
regional harmony.

In fact,

it is quite possible that

petrodollars could destabilize the region.
British journal.
scenario.

Ian Smart in the

The World Today, has portrayed just such a
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In the thinly populated states of the Arabian
peninsula and the lower Gulf, I would expect the agoniz¬
ing choice between accepting manpower shortage as a
decisive constraint on economic development and inviting
a possible uncontrollable increase in immigration to be
particularly disruptive, just as I would expect a growing
danger of "palace revolutions", ostensibly over policy,
but actually over the control of the existing system.
In the more thickly populated Arab oil-producing states
of the area (Iraq and probably Kuwait), I would expect
the more serious danger to lie in the obstrusiveness of
economic differentials and the over-elaboration of
decision making structures, leading to a much higher
risk than elsewhere of broadly based social and politi¬
cal dissent.
(Outside of the Gulf, the case of Libya may
resemble the former model, while that of Algeria may
resemble the latter.)5
In the case of the Saudi's Ramon Knauerhase has
observed,
The oil revenues have been a mixed blessing.
On one
hand, they have provided the kingdom with a steady, large
source of income which has been used to further economic
development; on the other hand, it has fostered a feeling
of euphoria, which has made many Saudis unwilling to
work on anything but government or a few selected
service jobs.
Most Saudis feel that anything can be
bought.^
Knauerhase's observation fits neatly into Smart's scenario.
If the Saudis will not perform manual tasks at home,
labor will be required.

imported

This labor could destabilize Saudi

society and at the same time the demand for foreign labor
could easily produce regional resentment as plentiful Saudi
petrodollars competed in capital starved local labor markets.
It is absolutely necessary that the unprecedented flow of
money in the oil rich Arab states be managed in such a way
as to maintain the presence of local labor and technology in
those states which are oil poor,

or present to those oil

poor states compensatory viable alternatives to national
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development.

We will return to the question of the

destabilizing potential of labor movement within the Arab
region in a following discussion of regional political con¬
flict;

for now it is sufficient to note that petrodollar

investment must be approached cautiously and,

if possible,

according to some criteria.
No comprehensive model is available to guide Arab
petrodollar investment, but a set of criteria for investment
has begun to materialize.

Ragaei Mallakh and Mihssen Kadhim

have listed four motives for investment:
motive;

(2)

and

the humanitarian motive.7

(4)

the cultural motive;

(3)

(1)

the political

the economic motive;

The cultural pressure to invest in the economic
development of "fellow Arabs" is high.®

The following

quotation illustrates the operation of a regional,

social

dynamic.
The political and cultural religious motives behind
Arab oil producer's aid to Arab non-oil producing
countries are obvious; the people of the two groups
share close affinities in language, religion, background,
and history.
In fact all Arab countries view themselves
as part and parcel of the Arab world.
Any oil producing
country, especially if small, finds itself under enor¬
mous pressures both from within and from the rest of the
Arab world to contribute to the economic development of
fellow Arab people.
This explains why such nations as
Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt and Abu Dhabi consider the orderly
development of fellow Arab states as an effective
deterrent to social and political instability within
the region.
Moreover, major Arab oil producers, with the possi¬
ble exception of Algeria, are labor deficit countries.
To accelerate their own economic and social development
they have been relying increasingly on expatriate labor,
notably, Palestinians, Egyptians, and Lebanese.
Competition for labor, especially skilled labor, may be
cited as a potent economic rationale for aid to labor
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surplus Arab countries.
Furthermore, economic coopera¬
tion between Arab oil producers and non-oil states,
Particularly at the commodity and sectoral levels, could
be of great potential benefit to all parties concerned.
There is greater realization that cooperation enlarges
the size of the market and reduces market uncertainty,
thereby permitting the exploitation of economies of
scale production.
It also allows for specialization
along the principle of co-operative advantage, contri¬
buting to more efficient allocation of resources.
The recent surge in oil prices created egregious
disparities in human wealth and human welfare conditions
between oil haves and have nots.
The gulf between these
two groups is most dramatic in the Arab world.
Countries
with relatively small populations like Abu Dhabi, Qatar,
Kuwayt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent
Iraq, suddenly have found themselves with enormous
financial resources far exceeding their domestic capital
absorptive capacities (at least in the immediate future),
while the people of Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Morocco, Jordan,
Syria, Tunisia, Somalia, and Mauritania are still living
close to subsistence or even starvation levels.
Thus
humanitarian considerations reflected in the moral prin¬
ciple of relative egalitarianism normally accepted within
a single country and community must be recognized as an
important factor in Arab aid giving.9
The investment of petrodollars must produce both
profits and regional equity.

Profit itself may be abstracted

from capitalist ideology and viewed as capital formation.
The ultimate objective of petrodollar investment should be
the viability of the regional economy in the context of a
viable global economy.

Oil is a wasting resource and is the

lifeblood of industrial society.
industrial age are not to be lost,

If the fruits of the
the oil fields of the

Middle East must not become a future battleground for
national,

regional, or global adversaries.

Efforts to pro¬

mote regional stability and integrity will help to ensure
the steady flow of petroleum to markets throughout the world,
thereby obviating superpower conflict while improving the

lives of the regional inhabitants.

Political Factors
The presence of intrusive, hegemonical powers within
the Arab region constitutes the first level of political
conflict within the Arab region.

Cantori and Spiegel iden¬

tify nine methods of participation by an intrusive power
within a region:

(1)

arrangements;

trade and economic investments;

(3)

session of a colony;
sion;

(7)

multilateral arrangements;

(5)

military intervention;

the United Nations;

activities;

(9)

propaganda."'"®

(8)

(2)

bilateral

(4)

(6)

pos¬

subver¬

cultural and educational

The United States and the

Soviet Union employ most of the identified intrusive methods
to further their respective national interests within the
Arab region.
U.S.S.R.

The struggle for hegemony leads the U.S.

to seek "clients"

in the Middle East."'""'"

and

To the

degree the superpowers are successful in recruiting clients,
or imposing their wills upon the policies of Arab states,

the

natural process of regional integration is interrupted by
injection of extraregional conflict and identification.
The polarization of Arab states along the issue of Egypt's
direct negotiations with Israel,
to Jerusalem,

specifically Sadat's visit

into rejectionist and moderate camps is

indicative of the competition between intrusive powers.
A spin-off of superpower conflict is the conflict
of economic systems associated respectively with the U.S.
and U.S.S.R.

The caveat that must be expressed is all
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economic conflict of an ideological nature is not necessarily
the work of superpowers.

Intellectual and political elites

w

ithin the Arab region champion ideologies which are Arab in

character;

that is to say, Arab socialism is not Soviet

socialism,

but not to say Soviet or Chinese socialism have

not influenced Arab socialist ideology.

What is important

is the relative incompatibility of socialist and capitalist
economic systems.
Jahagir Amuzegar remarks in his article,

"Ideology

and Economic Growth in the Middle East",
In their search for rapid economic development in
the postwar period, the less developed countries have
been faced with two main paths to growth, championed by
two rival ideologies.
The "centralists" have stressed
the importance of comprehensive planning, public owner¬
ship and enterprise, heavy industrialization, and a
reliance on a strong and, if necessary, heavy-handed
central authority.
The "free marketeers", on the other
hand, have emphasized nearly the opposite:
considerable
economic freedom and initiative for individuals; private
ownership and operation in all but a few "securitysensitive" economic activities; development of a solid
agricultural base; and a philosophical commitment to
"democratic institutions", e.g., a multiparty system.12
Amuzegar goes on to describe Arab socialism as a
"complex melange of Islamic egalitarianism, Eastern politi¬
cal tradition, modern social democracy,
colonialism,

latter-day anti-

and a dash of socialist orthodoxy."

1

Though it could be plausibly argued that this
discussion of conflict of economic ideology could be dis¬
cussed under the previous heading of "Economic Factors",

the

real impediment to integration is not the "technological"
problem of meshing divergent systems,

rather the political
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orientation of the elites in power in the respective ideolo¬
gical systems and the inability of those elites to accept
each others solutions to the problems of development.
cooperation is to be forged out of this divergence,

If

the basis

of such cooperation must strive for ideological neutrality.
The basis for cooperation in the Middle East must appeal to
the developmental needs of the Arab nations,
come the disincentives for unified action.

and thus over¬
The "freemar-

keteers" or potential petro-dollar investors must overcome
their fears of nationalization and doubts about the
efficiency of socialist economies, while the "centralists"
or "socialists" must overcome their ideological abhorence of
the profit motive and latent fears of neo-colonialism.
Economics and politics are as inextricable in the Middle
East as they are anywhere else.
The presence of intrusive powers in the Middle East
can be placed in an equation which balances external loyalty
reciprocally with internal cohesion.

The intrusion of the

United States and the Soviet Union in the Arab region can be
perceived to be detrimental to the process of integration,
so long as that incursion promotes loyalty which is greater
to the external intrusive powers than to an Arab integrative core.

The secondary association of Arab economies with

divergent economical philosophies is a limiting factor on
the type and extent of integration possible within the region.
A Pan-Arabist approach to integration must acknowledge
clientel relationships and the diversity of economic systems
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but can seek to diminish the effects of these differences by
defining an area of common ground where conununication,
cooperation,
productive,

and eventual integration can be pursued in a
developmental,

and relatively non-controversial

way.
Though it may be argued that the presence of Israel
as a perceived common threat to the Arab states is an inte¬
grating factor within the region,

this simplistic presumption

ignores the underlying web of external loyalties and interdependencies.

Furthermore,

the type of integration promoted

by military threat is at best an unstable alliance that
promotes military investment and cooperation but fails to
address the common needs of the Arab people such as the
needs

for development and stability.

Clearly, Arabs cannot

indefinitely depend upon Israel as a primary source of
cohesion.

In the final analysis, Arab unity must reflect

positive values if it is to survive the vagaries of regional
conflict.

Bernard Lewis wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1968,

It would not be easy for the great powers to lose
interest and might well be painful for the Middle East,
where the final fulfillment of the long-standing demand
for the end of imperialism could have disconcerting
political and economic effects.
Without foreign stimu¬
lation, there would be grave danger of deterioration and
regression; without foreign irritants, there might be
some hope of peace.14
A decade has made Lewis

1

concern about the effects

of a loss of "foreign stimulation" dated.

The economic

potential of the Middle East as well as its interdependence
is assured.

Lewis'

observation that "the hope for peace"

is
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related to the removal of "foreign irritants"

is more timely.

Though it is impossible to extract the Middle East from the
global web of interdependence,

the prospect of the removal

of "foreign irritants" is both desirable and tangible.

The

dynamics of such a removal involve the mutual consent of the
United States and the Soviet Union to allow the Arab region
to evolve as such,

and the ability of the Arabs themselves

to overcome the obstacles to cooperation.

The emergence of

an autonomous region without a military portfolio is con¬
ceivable if those intrusion powers in the global system
would agree to mutual restraint.

The strengthening of the

autonomy of the Arab region must depend upon an intricate
balance of global and region forces.
developing Arab region,

A de-militarized,

defused as a possible source of

super-power conflict, may be the best of all possible worlds
for all parties concerned.
The second level of political conflict in the Arab
region is among the Arab nations themselves.
are traditional and historical conflicts.

First,

there

Michael Van Dusen

states,
One of the greatest obstacles to political integration
in developing societies is regionalism or localism.
Within the Arab Middle East local loyalties continue to
a large extent to define the nature of political com¬
mitments .
It must be remembered that most Arab nations are
emerging from colonialism.

Colonial powers depended upon

the inability of their subjects to unite in opposition to
their colonial masters.

The British,

Turks,

and French had
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a vested interest in internal divisions of the Arab peoples.
It is not surprising that these internal divisions have sur¬
faced as violence in Lebanon,

Syria,

Iraq,

and Jordan.

Conflict internal to or regardless of national borders is one
type of historical or traditional conflict.
Historically, Arab nations have known conflict.
Though national conflicts were muted by the Ottoman Turks
and the European colonialists,
centers of Cairo,

Damascus,

the historical cultural

and Bagdad also spawned their

respective political champions.

The potential for competi¬

tion for a dominant role in any scheme of Arab cooperation
is evident from the behavior of the Arab states in the forma¬
tion and dissolution of the United Arab Republic.
No plan for any type of regional integration can
ignore the traditional conflicts within the region.

Competi¬

tion for regional supremacy is almost a foregone conclusion.
Competition within a region can, however, be positive,

if

the objective of competition is the greatest contribution to
regional development projects or ventures within the frame¬
work of regional complementarity,
increases,

or agricultural yield

or any of the many possible ways than mankind can

cooperatively better its lot.
A second type of regional conflict exists because
different types of power centers can be identified within
the Arab region.
With its vast oil reserves and traditional religious
significance,

Saudi Arabia is unquestionably a center of the
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Arab world.
funding,

As a possible distribution point of development

Saudi Arabia draws the hopeful and ambitious as

surely as Mecca draws its pilgrims.
Egypt, with its mass of humanity and proud history,
is a political center of the Arab region.

On the basis of

its population alone, Egypt would be a center of demographic
power; but in the case of Egypt,

it is the intangible power

of the legacy of Nasser that also figures in its centrality
to the issue of Arab nationalism.
A nation without a state,
the third center.

the Palestinian nation is

Palestine is a common cause of the Arabs.

The issue of Palestine transcends the land in contention, and
to some degree ignores the well-being of the Palestinians
and instead focuses on the pride of the Arab people.
Palestine,

as an Arab issue,

gained currency as Pan-Arab

nationalism encountered the realities of power politics.
The association of Palestinian intellectuals with Arab or
revolutionary socialism is strong.

Palestine seems to

coalesce the frustrations of the Arab people and thus serves
as a center of social consciousness in the Arab region.
The existence of physically and functionally diver¬
gent centers within the Arab region can contribute to con¬
flict,

or if properly balanced could serve as a mechanism for

the distribution of power on an equitable basis throughout
the region.

A regional system of checks and balances is not

such a far flung concept,

but it is one that is entirely de¬

pendent upon the rejection of violence as a means of settling
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regional conflict.

With the development of infrastructure

projects would come the beginning of a regional administra¬
tion that could eventually temper the sources of conflict
that otherwise might instigate violence or deposit conflict
in the mercuric chambers of international diplomacy.
The third type of regional conflict has already been
touched upon in the earlier discussion of the distribution
of oil reserves and labor within the region.
petrodollars can attract labor,
oil-poor,

the movement of labor from

labor-rich to oil-rich,

continue.

As long as

labor-poor nations will

With the movement of labor will be an increasing

potential for social upheaval in both labor contributing and
labor receiving nations.

Ian Smart remarks on the future

dmoestic condition of the Arab states.
I do not mean to paint too black a picture.
I see
no reason why the pressure of domestic ferment should
not be contained--and, in the longer term, dissipated-in most of the countries concerned.
Meanwhile, I expect
some reduction in the level of international conflict in
the region.
The fact remains that I foresee a decade of
rising domestic turbulence within many of these countries,
just as I expect an increasing conservatism in the for¬
mal domestic and external policies of their governments.16
Unfortunately Mr. Smart does not provide the basis
of his optimism.
turbulence"

If Smart's prediction of "rising domestic

is correct,

then definite measures must be under¬

taken which will accommodate both the need for the easy
movement of labor within the Arab region and the turbulence
inherent in such movement.

If labor movement is tied to

project development and the fruits of labor are clearly
evident in the form of regional development projects,

then
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labor movement could be monitored and controlled, while
labor and labor pools would avoid the malaise of alienation.
If the third level of conflict,
imbalances,

internal sociological

are allowed to exacerbate,

the ensuing instabi¬

lity could be easily exploited by the Soviet Union,

or in

defense against such exploitation lead to intolerable
authoritarian regimes.

Labor movement and manpower develop¬

ment must be regionally coordinated.
tiered society,
working class,

The creation of a two-

made up of the petroleum rich and a poor
is not compatible with the process of long

range development.

Regional answers must address regional

problems.

Prescriptions:

A Prologue

The politics and economics of the Middle East
coupled with the cultural homogeneity of the Arab Region
serve as a perfect setting for the merger of integration and
development projects.

The Arab region contains great natural,

financial and human resources.

The region itself is ripe

for development as teeming masses cry for a better life and
unexploited natural resources encourage the development of
infrastructure,

transportation and industrial capacity.

The

likelihood of a comprehensive scheme for integration in the
Arab region is significantly diminished by the presence of
tangible political and economic obstacles.

Disparities

between Arab nations in development, population,
alignment, wealth,

ideology,

and traditional affinities obstruct Pan-
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Arabism, but,

paradoxically,

at the same time, make a Pan-

Arabist approach to integration and development necessary.
Only by avoiding confrontation with the overpowering
obstacles to integration can integration gain sufficient
impetus to eventually challenge the disparity and illogic of
a divided Arab World.
desirability,

By defining objectives of mutual

the cohesion of the Arab states can be

strengthened to the point where the "classical" model of
integration "takes-off" or begins to operate.
in history,

At this point

it is unlikely that any comprehensive plan or

model for integration in the Arab region would be anything
more than wishful thinking.

In a region,

or moreso,

where technical expertise is at the premium,

a world

the engineers

of human cooperation and development can best be utilized in
the attainment of objectives that have a relatively high
probability of attainment.

Such attainable objectives can

be determined by a logical set of criterion.
Rondinelli observes,

Dennis

"Nearly all theorists advocate that

development projects be initiated through identification and
analysis of problems susceptible to solution by project
investment."
Dr.
project.

1 7
Rondinelli establishes a cycle for a well planned

Rondinelli's cycle will be a useful template for

the projects which will later be prescribed.
Cycle for a well-planned project
1. identification and definition
2. formulation, preparation, and design
3. appraisal
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

selection, negotiation, and approval
activation and organization
implementation and operation
supervision, coordination, and control
termination or completion
dissemination of output and transition to normal
administration
post evaluation and follow up
Rondinelli's cycle is particularly appropriate to a

developing context because it stresses planning,
and follow up.

transition,

Planning of projects is necessary to the

requirement of best utilization of limited resources.
Transition from the project mode to the administrative mode
is necessary to the stability and continuation of the effort
underway.

Evaluation and follow-up are in recognition of

the experimental stage of project development;

and the need

to identify modalities which work in the context to which
they are applied.

Rondinelli has noted,

"Analysis of project

planning and implementation in developing nations leaves
little doubt that extensive improvements are needed in over¬
all management capacity."-^
Projects alone are not the solution to development
and integration in the Middle East.

As Rondinelli has noted,

there is in absence of managerial capacity in the region.
This shortage can be and is being addressed by extensive
education projects, but these projects could be augmented by
specific policies which coordinated and assigned available
managerial manpower and expertise in a rational way.
the question of the allocation of manpower lie other
structural impediments to integration and development.

Beyond

87
Tariffs,

currency,

finance,

and the competition for the bene¬

fits of proposed projects must all be dealt with if projects
of a regional scope can be undertaken.

Though a comprehen¬

sive scheme for integration and development cannot precede
the development needs and consequent solutions to those needs,
the identification,

selection,

and implementation of projects

will create a need for a type of integrating mechanism that
would be self-perpetuating.

In other words,

as projects

confronted the obstacles to their implementation,

the per¬

ceived need for those projects would stimulate the solutions
necessary to overcome the obstacles.

The solutions necessary

to overcome the obstacles would be the building blocks for a
comprehensive scheme of integration.
pursued inductively,

in the field,

in the conference room.
be identified,
therefore,

Integration would be

instead of deductively,

However, before projects can even

a certain level of cooperation must exist;

the prescriptions which follow must not only

identify projects but must identify those areas necessary to
inception of the cycle for a well-planned project.

Thus,

following prescriptions will concern the financial and
political infrastructure of the region as well as the
particular projects best suited to meet the development
needs of the people.

These general prescriptions will be

followed by a discussion of several specific potential and
ongoing projects in the region.

the

CHAPTER V

PRESCRIPTIONS

A theoretical basis for prescription has been
established.

An exploration of the values and context of

the Arab peoples has begun.

Integration theory has been

modified in light of the development needs of the Arab
region.

The politics and economics of the Middle East have

been correlated with the prospects of regional integration.
It is now possible to conclude this study with several
modest prescriptions which can be derived from the antecedent
theory and analysis.

Prescriptions will be ventured that

address both general conditions and specific projects.
is hoped that this study,

It

if not making new prescriptions,

has to some degree provided a foundation for the prescrip¬
tions selected by the tedious process undertaken by this
author.

General Prescriptions
With the tremendous impact of petrodollars on the
Arab region diluted by the absence of a coordinated effort
to distribute funds so as to maximize regional development,
a prescription which proposes a centralized financial
authority is necessary.

Given the need of petrodollar

investors to see a fair return on investment,
88

a centralized

89
financial authority could take the form of a central lending
agency for the Arab region.

National lending agencies have

developed in Kuwait, Abu Dhabi,
a regional basis,

in 1968,

Libya,

and Saudi Arabia.

On

the Arab Fund for Economic and

Social Development was formed.

The formation of the Inter-

Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation brought into being an
entity which insures investment funds against the vagaries
of nationalization,

revolution,

and war.

Though the

existence of these funds and the Inter-Arab Investment
Guarantee Corporation is a positive indication of interest
in and commitment to regional development, Mallakh and
Kadhim have observed.
The proliferation of development lending agencies
appears to:
1. encourage the diffusion of scarce manpower,
planners, economists, administrators, engineers, and
technicians--into small units which are less capable and
efficient in the evaluation of submitted projects without
delay and in a reasonably professional manner;
2. prevent the application of uniform criteria for
project appraisal both among and within sectors and
countries.
The establishment of such criteria would
greatly enhance the prospects of regional development
and economic integration as the flow of aid would be
channeled to countries and sectors with the explicit
goal of securing such an outcome;
3. militate against the formulation of integrated
programs of aid to individual recipient countries;
4. increase the costs of aid administration and
surveillance.
These costs may be substantially reduced
and the effectiveness of aid supervision considerably
strengthened if the lending agency is large enough to
permit the establishment of country or regional and subregional representative offices in the recipient
countries;
5. reduce the capability of individual lending
agencies to carry out substantive and comprehensive
research concerning the economies of recipient countries,
the promising avenues of investment, and possibly the
preparation of a list of bankable projects;
6. increase the donor's non-development consideration
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since a national lending institution is more likely to
be subject to narrow political pressures than a multi¬
national agency.
Moreover, multinational aid agencies,
which include the recipient countries, even if on a
modest scale, increase the sense of involvement and
participation of the latter in the aid program to the
benefit of all concerned.
It is, therefore, in the interest of the donor and
recipient alike that the proliferation of Arab nonspecialized development lending institutions be
restrained and a move toward consolidation or at least
coordination of their various lending agencies be
initiated.1
Demir looks at the proliferation of lending institu¬
tions in a more positive light.

"This plethora of institu¬

tions geared toward Arab regional development provides a
unique chance for economic development and possibly economic
integration within the region."2
Although Demir applauds the existence of the insti¬
tutions, he,

like Mallahk and Kadhim,

tion of their activities.

proposes the coordina¬

It is no small surprise that

Demir, an employee of UNITAR, proposes a large role for the
United Nations in the coordination of these agencies.
Specifically,

Demir mentions the Economic Commission for

Western Asia and the United Nations Development Programme as
major role players.
(FAO, UNIDO, WHO,

The use of other UN specialized agencies

UNCTAD,

etc.)

to assist in actual project

O
selection and implementation is also suggested by Demir.-"
A centralized lending authority need not preempt
existing agencies;

rather,

it could form a hub from which

the other agencies would share information and combine
efforts.

The availability of UN specialized agencies to

augment the selection and implementation phases of project
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development could add needed expertise.
A second general prescription is drawn from the
functionalist's concern over the potential of regionalism to
create super-states.

To avert alienation from the periphery,

Arab development projects should, when possible,
the borders of the region into black Africa,
tier countries of Turkey,

Pakistan,

go beyond

and the northern

and Iran.

To promote

South-South solidarity, Arab development funds and lending
agencies should continue to support projects completely
external to the region, but of real need to other develop¬
ing areas.

To guarantee the viability of the OECD economies

from which valuable technology is imported,

internal

development should be tempered by a commitment to recycle
petrodollars.
The final general prescription is for a central
clearing house for currency and the establishment of a time¬
table for conversion to a common currency of foreign
exchange.

This prescription applies to the technical

requirements of funding multinational projects.
The first specific prescription is that the proposed
funding for the Sudanese Agricultural Project be invested as
planned.

Ahmed Abou-Bakr writes,

. . . the Arab Authority for Agricultural investment, an
investment group made up of petroleum-producing Arab
nations, in 1975 concluded a 5.7 billion dollar agree¬
ment with the government of Sudan to develop all sectors
of the economy in the next ten years.4
Three billion dollars is earmarked for agricultural
development alone.^

The Sudan hopes to be self-sufficient
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by 1985 in all basic food products and export 20 per cent of
the entire Arab region's meat and sugar and 40 per cent of
the regions vegetable oil.^

However,

Dr. Anis Barghouti,

the economic attache to the Arab League Mission to the
United Nations,

remarked in March 1978 that little had been

done to fulfill the promise of the Sudan.

Agricultural

development should be a priority for Pan-Arabist decisionmakers .
Another area of prescription involves the develop¬
ment of regional pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.

At

present the need for prescription and non-prescription drugs
in the Arab region is met almost entirely by export.^

The

Arab Economic Unity Council is experimenting with the
creation of jointly financed region corporations whose
products would be free from tariff.

The pharmaceutical

manufacturing project would address a cormnon need in both an
economical and profitable manner.
The final specific prescription is for the creation
of a development project identification team made up of
international civil servants,
experts,

technical experts,

financial

and liasons to the funding agencies and finance

ministries.

This team would strive for political detachment

in its assessment of the development needs in the Arab
region.

The team itself would not be affiliated with a

particular agency but might offer its recommendations to a
central agency if one were formed.
These general and specific prescriptions are not
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exhaustive by any means.

They are compatible with the

philosophy expressed in the theory for Regional Integrative
Development.

The prescriptions are not overwhelming or

Particularly far-reaching.

They are attainable within the

present context of the Middle East.

CONCLUSION

A basis for prescriptive theory has been developed.
A theory of Regional Integrative Development has been
collated from theories of integration.

The Arab context has

been sketched and some prescriptions have been written.
in conclusion,

But

this author feels that the true dynamics of

the Middle East remain hidden.

Animosities run deep and

unpredictability is the only thing that seems to be pre¬
dictable.

The shock of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem,

the

invasion of southern Lebanon, and the intransigence of
Menachem Begin bely a deeper reality at work.

The innocence

of David Mitrany is in stark contrast to the harsh realities
of refugee camps,
war,

terrorism,

the occupation of land won in

and a political tension that erupts at the slightest

provocation.

The shock waves of four wars are still felt

and yet the peacemakers are seemingly ignored.

The imposi¬

tion of a settlement in the Middle East is appealing in its
simplicity but seems impossible to implement.
The Middle East is armed to an unprecedented degree.
War in the Middle East is a real threat.

Steps must be

taken to alleviate the tensions which beset the region.
The impediments to a just and lasting peace are
three-fold.
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1. the absence of a guarantee of survival for
Israel
2. the absence of a Palestinian homeland
3. the continued occupation of Arab territories
The prescriptions of Chapter V do not directly
address these impediments.

Hopefully,

peace can be con¬

structed out of a program of development.

A concerted

effort toward Regional Integrative Development would occupy
minds otherwise spent in hatred or despair.
alism and its step-son,

But function-

Regional Integrative Development,

are particularly helpless during the lag time between
conceptualization and the harvest of the fruits of integra¬
tion.

Restraint must be practiced and a program of regional

development should begin.
The incentives for peace become tangible when men
perceive themselves to be bettering their lives.
That the solidarity of the Arab people is a perceived
threat to the security of Israel is an ironic twist,

for it

is only through solidarity that an equitable distribution
of manpower and resources can be attained.
Without a regional program of cooperation the
inequity of Arab life will destabilize governments and
encourage demogoguery.

The distribution of wealth in the

Arab region is uneven.

Petrodollars should to an increasing

per cent be routed through the Arab region.
The prospects

for peace are almost entirely dependent

on the affirmative actions of those who seek to build peace

from the shared needs of a beleaguered humanity.

The

prescriptions offered in this study are at worst benign.
The organization of Pan-Arabist sentiment into functional
units and applied to specific projects could be an
important first step toward eventual peace and prosperity
in the Middle East.
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